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ABSTRACT PAGE

Roy Olmstead (1886-1966) made millions by smuggling Canadian whisky into Seattle
during Prohibition. He was the defendant in the first wiretapping case to reach the U. S.
Supreme Court. Before getting to the Supreme Court, Olmstead was tried in the federal
courts in Seattle for conspiracy to violate the Volstead Act (the enabling legislation of the
Eighteenth, or Prohibition, Amendment).
Olmstead v. United States reached the Court in 1928.
In it, the Justices held that
wiretapping did not qualify as a search and seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment,
and so did not necessitate a warrant. The court was split 5-4, with Chief Justice Taft
writing the majority opinion and Justices Brandeis and Holmes writing separate dissents. It
was in this case that Brandeis, in his dissent, first articulates the notion of a "right to be let
alone"— the right to privacy.
A fresh look not only at his case from start to finish, but also the circumstances surrounding
it, will allow consideration of the overzealousness of law enforcement officials, the
em ergence of criminal business enterprises, the new technologies and their use (or
misuse) by law enforcement, and how these factors combined during Prohibition to create
the historical moment when privacy would begin to be discussed by the Court.
This paper uses the Olmstead case as a lens through which to view these peculiar
circumstances of Prohibition and the way they brought the issue of privacy to a head.
While Olmstead was eventually overturned, Brandeis’s dissent is often cited in modern
cases exploring issues of the limits of government intrusion into personal privacy when
attempting to enforce drug legislation.
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Prohibition. 1920-1933. At its best, it was a time of wild abandon, with
speakeasies, jazz, and G-men. At its worst, it was a time of widespread disregard for
federal law, endemic corruption of politics and law enforcement, and innocents caught in
the crossfire of ruthless gangsters. Public perception of the Prohibition law, the agency
designed to enforce that law, and the criminal enterprises that emerged to evade the law
all contributed to an escalating judicial exploration of the Fourth Amendment.1 The
contours of the “search and seizure” provision of the Amendment developed in tandem
with the actual practices of law enforcement officials that investigated and arrested
violators of the Prohibition laws. A social and legal environment emerged that tested the
limits of government intrusion physically and theoretically into the life of a citizen.
Eventually, in 1928, the United States Supreme Court began to discuss privacy as a right
protected by the Fourth Amendment. This paper will examine the public response to the
Prohibition law, the law enforcement apparatus that was legislated to enforce Prohibition,
and the criminal enterprises that developed in the 1920s. It will explore the
interconnections between these developments and Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis’s assertion in 1928’s Olmstead et. al. v. United States that privacy should be
protected by law.
In the case of Olmstead v. U.S., which the Supreme Court decided in 1928,
Associate Justice Louis Brandeis articulated the right to privacy for the first time in
federal jurisprudence. The escalating controversies surrounding the Prohibition law and
enforcement of that law led the case to the Court. Olmstead was the first wiretapping

1 "The right o f th e p eo p le to b e secu re in their p ersons, h o u ses, papers, and effec ts, against u nreason able
sea rch es and seizu res, shall n ot be violated , and no W arrants shall issue, but upon p robable cau se,
su p p orted by Oath or affirm ation, and particularly describing th e place to b e sea rch ed , and th e p erson s or
things to b e seized." U.S. Const. A m end. IV.

2

case to reach the Supreme Court, where the Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that federal
officers could, without a warrant, install a wiretap and use the evidence obtained with it
in prosecution, so long as the officers did not physically trespass on the defendant’s
property. Though Brandeis wrote the dissent in the case, and the Court found in favor of
the government, Brandeis’s “right to be let alone” later became the cornerstone of privacy
law.2
Nicknamed ‘king of the bootleggers,’ Roy Olmstead managed his criminal
enterprise without violence and intimidation. For four years before he was arrested in
1924, Olmstead controlled the majority of liquor entering Seattle and supplied most of
the Pacific Northwest. Rumrunning was his business; he had investors, lawyers, boats,
over seventy-five employees, properties, and a complex network of international contacts
and contracts dedicated to the enterprise. He made over $200,000 a month in his heyday,
and kept millions of people supplied with liquor that was cheaper and safer than that
supplied to the rest of the country.4 He did not dabble outside of booze-running; he did
not allow his crew to carry weapons; he had no ties to gambling, prostitution, and murder.
As a result, his case uniquely placed the investigation, arrest, prosecution, and conviction
of Olmstead squarely within Prohibition law.

2 Olm stead et. al. v. U nited States 277 U.S. 4.38 (1928).
3 N ew York Times, "Seattle Dry Chief and Aides Indicted," May 2 7 ,1 9 3 0 .
4 In th e Suprem e Court op inion, Chief Justice Howard Taft d escrib ed O lm stead 's "conspiracy o f am azing
m agnitude to im port, p o sse ss and sell liquor unlawfully. It involved th e em p lo y m e n t o f not less than fifty
p ersons, o f tw o sea g o in g v e sse ls for th e tran sportation o f liquor to [from] British Colum bia, o f sm aller
v essels for co a stw ise tran sportation to th e S tate o f W ashington, th e purchase and u se o f a ranch b eyon d
th e suburban limits o f S ea ttle, w ith a large underground cach e for sto ra g e and a num ber o f sm aller ca ch es
in that city, th e m ain ten an ce o f a central office m ann ed w ith op erators, th e em p lo y m en t of ex ecu tiv es,
sa lesm en , d eliverym en , d ispatchers, scou ts, b ook k eep ers, collectors and an attorney. In a bad m onth

sales am ou n ted to $ 1 7 6 ,0 0 0 ; th e aggregate for a year m ust h ave e x c e e d e d tw o m illions o f dollars."
O lm stead v. U.S. 211 U.S. 4 3 8 , 4 5 5 -4 5 6 .
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Histories of temperance and alcohol in America from the time of the Founding
Fathers through modem times have been written by many scholars.5 Many historians
have focused on the temperance movement and the events leading up to Prohibition.6
Others have concentrated on the politics and mechanisms leading to the repeal of the
Eighteenth Amendment.7 Works devoted entirely to Prohibition exist, but are general in
nature. Each of these general histories has a section on issues of enforcement, and some
even dedicate a few pages to Olmstead, either the man or the court case.

o

There are also several social histories of Prohibition and life during the 1920s.
The earliest, Frederick Lewis Allen’s 1931 Only Yesterday: An Informal History o f the
1920s, offered a unique perspective in that it was written just after the period it covers.
Allen acknowledged that he could not benefit from the hindsight from which historians
usually engage. He did, however, have the insight of contemporaries that he used to

5 For a history o f alcohol con su m p tion from 1 7 9 0 to 1840, s e e W. J. Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic: An
Am erican Tradition (Oxford: Oxford U niversity Press, 1979). For stu d ies th a t broadly sw e e p through th e

history o f alcohol in A m erica, s e e A ndrew Barr, Drink: A Social History o f Am erica (N ew York: Carrol and
Graf Publishers, Inc., 1999), C atherine Gilbert Murdock, Dom esticating Drink: W om en, M e n , and Alcohol
in America, 1 8 7 0 -1 9 4 0 (Baltim ore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998) and Mark Edward Lender and
Jam es Kirby Martin, Drinking in Am erica: A History (N ew York: The Free Press, 1982).
6 For th e in tersection b e tw e e n tem p e ra n ce , politics, statu s, and class, s e e Joseph R. G usfield, Symbolic
Crusade: Status Politics and the Am erican Temperance M o v e m e n t (Urbana: U niversity o f Illinois Press,
1963). For an ec o n o m ic history o f th e tem p e ra n ce m o v em en t th a t also e n c o m p a sse s prohibition, s e e
John J. Rumbarger, Profits, Power, an d Prohibition: Alcohol Reform and the Industrializing o f America,
1 8 0 0 -1 9 3 0 (Albany: State U niversity o f N ew York Press, 1989). For links b e tw e e n th e cam paign for
national Prohibition and P rogressive reform s, s e e Jam es H. Tim berlake, Prohibition an d the Progressive
M ovem ent, 1 9 0 0 -1 9 2 0 (Cam bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963) and Ann-M arie Szymanski,
Pathways to Prohibition: Radicals, M o derates, and Social M o v e m e n t Outcomes (Durham , NC: Duke
University Press, 2003).
7 David E. Kyvig fo cu sed on th e legal p ro ce sse s and political su p p ort n ecessa ry for repeal in Repealing
N atio n al Prohibition (Kent, OH: Kent S tate U niversity Press, 2000). K enneth D. R ose stu d ied w o m en 's
instrum entality in repeal in A m erican W om en an d the Repeal o f Prohibition (N ew York: N ew York
University Press, 1996).
8 Norm an H. Clark, Deliver Us From Evil: An In terpretation o f Am erican Prohibition (N ew York: W. W.
Norton and Com pany, 1976) no m en tion o f O lm stead. Thom as M. C offey, The Long Thirst: Prohibition in
Am erica: 1 9 2 0 -1 9 3 3 (N ew York: W. W. N orton and Company, 1975) no m en tio n o f O lm stead . John
Kobler, A rd ent Spirits: The Rise an d Fall o f Prohibition (N ew York: Putnam , 1 9 7 3 ) 3 2 7 -3 3 2 . Edward Behr,
Thirteen Years th a t Changed A m erica (N ew York: Arcade Publishing, 1996) 1 3 7 -1 3 9 , 221.
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write about the things that mattered to people during the 1920s, “the fads, fashions and
follies of the time, the things which millions of people thought about and talked about
and became excited about and which at once touched their daily lives.” When he wrote
his book, Prohibition had not yet been repealed. The picture he painted of the popular
impression of the Prohibition experience is what was written at the beginning of this
paper - gangsters, corrupt and inefficient government agents, intemperance by many; in
short, he portrayed a public that was frustrated with the “Noble Experiment.”9
The “coalescence of a modern culture” is the subject of Lynn Dumenil’s 1995 The
Modern Temper: American Culture and Society in the 1920s. She evaluates the
experiences of African Americans, immigrants, and native-born ethnic peoples in the
development of this modem culture. She describes an “erosion of community and
personal autonomy in the face o f an increasingly nationalized and organized society.”
“The growth of corporate power, the developments reshaping politics, the transformation
of work, and the emergence of mass consumer culture dramatically reshaped American
life,’” she writes.10 Prohibition was a way for some to “impose cultural unity on an
increasingly heterogeneous and complex society.”11 For this reason, she concludes,
“controversy over the amendment and its enforcement infused the political debates of the
decade.”

10

For the entirety of the 1920s, Prohibition lay at the center of debates over

public and private power, class, and religious, racial, and ethnic identities.

9 Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday: An In fo rm a l History o f the 1920s (N ew York: Harper and Row,
1931) x. O ften attributed to Herbert H oover, this m oniker for Prohibition is a corruption o f a phrase
H oover u sed in a 1928 sp eech : "a great social and eco n o m ic ex p erim en t, n o b le in m o tiv e and far-reaching
in purpose." Herbert Hoover, The N e w Day: The Campaign Speeches o f H erb ert H oover (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1928) 29.
10 Lynn Dum enil, The M odern Temper: Am erican Culture and Society in the 1920s, Eric Foner, ed. (N ew
York: Hill and W ang, 1995) 12-13.
11 Dum enil, The M odern Temper, 226.
12 Dum enil, The M odern Temper, 234.

5

In his Daily Life in the United States, 1920-1940, David E. Kyvig focuses on the
lived experiences of Americans, noting that differences in such experiences depended on
diverse geographic, economic and social worlds.13 Kyvig frames his chronicle of daily
life with the “easily observable sign” that Americans were entering a “new era” —the
Eighteenth Amendment.14 Prohibition was a facet of daily life, whether in the context of
technology, dating, music, immigration, literature, film, or urbanization.
Joshua Zeitz writes about the women who were influential in the 1920s in
Flappers: A Madcap Story o f Sex, Style, Celebrity, and the Women who Made America
Modern. The ‘age of the flapper’ is “the story of America in the 1920s - the first
‘modem’ decade, when everyday life came under the full sway of mass media, celebrity,
and consumerism, when public rights gave way to private entitlements, and when people
as far and wide as Muncie, Indiana, and Somerset, Pennsylvania, came to share a national
standard of tastes and habits.”15 Zeitz wrote about the women and men that created the
image of the flapper, the women that lived as flappers, and those who embodied that
image in the culture industries. One of the defining features of the flapper was
“floutfing] the rules of Prohibition.” 16 These social histories remind us that the alcohol
and Prohibition permeated the daily lives of Americans.
Despite this rich work on the Prohibition Era, Roy Olmstead’s story has not yet
been investigated deeply by historians, though Olmstead and the court case are present in
much of the literature. Whispering Wires: The Tragic Tale o f an American Bootlegger,
by Philip Metcalfe, is the only work entirely dedicated to Olmstead, but is deeply flawed
13 David E. Kyvig, Daily Life in the United States, 1 9 2 0 -1 9 4 0 (Chicago: Ivan R. D ee, 2002).
14 Kyvig, Daily Life, 3.
15 Joshua Zeitz, Flapper: A M a d c a p Story o f Sex, Style, Celebrity, and the W om en Who M a d e Am erica
M odern (N ew York: Three Rivers Press, 200 6 ) 9.
16 Zeitz, Flapper, 117.

6

as Metcalfe used no citations and changed information and testimony to help the
narrative.17 Norman H. Clark’s The Dry Years: Prohibition and Social Change in
Washington devoted a chapter to Olmstead called “The Rumrunner.” These eighteen
•

pages are the most thorough historical account of Olmstead’s activities.

1o

Walter F.

Murphy approached the case from a political science perspective in his book,
Wiretapping on Trial: A Case Study in the Judicial Process. He uses Olmstead to
“illustrate how the judicial process frequently operates as a part o f the more general
process of public policy making.”19 Kenneth M. Murchison discusses the legal
significance of the Olmstead case at length in Federal Criminal Law Doctrine: The
Forgotten Influence o f Prohibition, but Olmstead’s story was relegated to a mere page of
introduction to the case study.

90

There are also a few works on wiretapping or privacy. Most well-known is The
Eavesdroppers, by Samuel Dash, Richard F. Schwartz and Robert E. Knowlton. This
book was written as a result of an investigation sponsored by the Pennsylvania Bar
Association in 1956. The book reviews the practice of wiretapping by law enforcement
and private individuals. It then summarizes the actual tools used by wiretappers and both
the federal and state laws associated with wiretapping. Although it is useful in learning
about the mechanics o f actually tapping a phone, its usefulness in this study is limited

17 Philip M etcalfe, Whispering Wires: A Tragic Tale o f an Am erican B ootlegger (Portland, OR: Inkwater
Press, 2007).
18 Norman H. Clark, "The Rumrunner," The Dry Years: Prohibition a n d Social Change in W ashington
(Seattle: U niversity o f W ash ington Press, 1965) 1 6 1-178.
19 W alter F. Murphy, W iretapping on Trial: A Case Study in the Judicial Process (N ew York: Random H ouse,
1965) 9.
20 Kenneth M. M urchison, Federal Crim inal Law Doctrines: The Forgotten Influence o f Prohibition (Durham,
NC: Duke U niversity Press, 1994) 65-68.

7
•

since it is temporally based so long after the Prohibition period.

91

Privacy on the Line:

The Politics o f Wiretapping and Encryption, by Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau, is
more relevant. The chapter on “Privacy Protection in the United States” discusses the
evolution of legal protections privacy in America since colonial times. This chapter also
discusses at length how the concept of privacy is embedded in American (and
international) legal culture, and the reasons why privacy is so important. There is also a
chapter specifically dedicated to wiretapping and how it evolved from eavesdropping and
letter opening, which then traces the law and jurisprudence pertaining to wiretapping.22
The legal-historiography of the Olmstead case centers on the privacy rights
touched on by Chief Justice Howard Taft (in the majority opinion) and Associate Justice
Louis Brandeis (in his dissent). Most legal scholars have since sided with Brandeis’s
belief that privacy is not bounded by physical space and that law enforcement should not
be allowed to enter citizens’ private sphere even remotely. Some contemporary writers
found Taft’s opinion valid in arguing that a physical trespass is necessary to prompt a
constitutionally-protected privacy right - but - Brandeis’s dissent is still cited today (as
good law, since Olmstead was overturned in 1967). A Lexis-Nexis search revealed
nearly 2,500 law journal articles citing this case, on such varied topics in privacy law as
employers accessing employees’ internet or email accounts, sexuality in the home,
pornography, children accessing adoption records, investigation of drug and smuggling
*
9^
operations, and government surveillance technology in the wake of 9/11.

21 Sam uel Dash, Richard F. Schw artz, and Robert E. Knowlton, The Eavesdroppers (N ew York: Da Capo
Press York, 1971).
22 W hitfield Diffie and Susan Landau, Privacy on the Line: The Politics o f W iretapping and Encryption
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007) 1 41-204 .
23 Olm stead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 438: "The Fourth A m end m en t [is not] v iolated against a d efen d a n t unless
th ere has b een an official search and seizu re o f his person, or such seizu re o f his p apers or his tangible

8

Olmstead, and Olmstead, are embedded within the literature of Prohibition, as are
the issues surrounding enforcement of the Volstead Act and the resulting implications for
the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. This paper serves to pull the
scattering of commentary on these issues from disparate sources, and directly confront
the Prohibition-Era Fourth-Amendment jurisprudence within its historical context.
The National Prohibition Act, or Volstead Act, was passed over presidential veto
on October 27, 1919.24 This was the enabling legislation for the Eighteenth Amendment
- the Prohibition Amendment, which was ratified on January 16, 1919. 25 The Volstead
Act went into effect in January of 1920. The law outlawed the sale, manufacture, or
distribution of alcohol for beverage purposes, with alcohol defined as anything above .05
percent alcohol by volume (ABV). Significantly, the Act prohibited neither the purchase
nor possession of alcohol.
After Prohibition became law, many Americans simply kept drinking. In fact,
according to Edward Behr, there was “an almost immediate, nationwide change in
drinking habits” as Americans seemed to embrace drinking. According to Behr, defying
m aterial effec ts, or an actual physical invasion o f his h o u se or 'curtilage' for th e p urposes o f m aking a
seizure. W e think, th erefo re, th at th e w iretapp ing here d isclosed did n ot a m o u n t to a search or seizure
w ithin th e m ean ing o f th e Fourth A m endm ent." (Taft writing for th e m ajority) O lm stead v. U.S., 2 7 7 U.S.
at 4 5 5 -4 5 6 ; "They [the m akers o f th e C onstitution] conferred, as against th e G overn m ent, th e right to be
let alon e - th e m ost co m p reh en siv e o f rights and th e right m o st valued by civilized m en. To p rotect that
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by th e G overn m ent upon th e privacy o f th e individual, w h a tev er th e
m ean s em p loyed , m ust b e d e e m e d a violation o f th e Fourth A m en d m en t. And th e use, as ev id en ce in a
criminal proceed in g, of facts ascertain ed by such intrusion m ust b e d e e m e d a violation o f th e Fifth."
(Brandeis dissenting) O lm stead v. U.S., 2 2 7 U.S. at 4 7 8 -4 7 9 .
24 41 U.S. Stat. 305, Title II: PROHIBITION OF INTOXICATING BEVERAGES, Sec. 3: "No person shall...
m anufacture, sell, barter, transport, im port, export, deliver, furnish, or p o sse ss any intoxicating liquor
ex c ep t as authorized in this Act." The Act did perm it th e m anufacture and sa le o f sacram en tal alcohol and
alcohol for n o n -b everage p u rp oses - sacram en tal w in e, industrial alcohol, and m edicinal alcohol. It also
allow ed th e h o m e production o f fruit-based ferm en ted b ev era g es (i.e. ciders and w in e), so long as th ey
w er e "non-intoxicating." For th e se b evera g es, th e Act did not sp ecify an ABV as ipso fa cto intoxicating.
25 U.S. Const. A m end. XVIII, Sec. 1: "After o n e year from th e ratification o f this article th e m anufacture,
sale, or transportation o f intoxicating liquors w ithin, th e im portation th e r e o f into, or th e exp ortation
th e r e o f from th e United S tates and all territory su bject to th e jurisdiction th e r e o f for b everage p u rp oses is
h ereby prohibited."

9

the law “became the thing to do, among students, flappers, and respectable middle-class
Americans all over the country.”26 In New York City, the popular press printed “weekly
quotes for cases of scotch, gin, and other spirits, noting when enforcement pressures had
driven prices up, and when a glut of supplies meant bargains were to be had on the black
market.” Lois “Lipstick” Long reviewed the various speakeasies across the city in her
column for The New Yorker. When Gustav Boess, the mayor of Berlin, visited New York
City in 1929 he asked James J. Walker, mayor of New York City, “When does the
Prohibition law go into effect?” It had been in effect for nearly ten years.

01

The image

projected by the media was that drinking was rampant. “Magazines and movies implied
that plenty of drinking was taking place,” wrote Kyvig.

OR

Novels like The Great Gats by

and films like Flaming Youth gave the impression that no one was obeying Prohibition.29
Both historians and contemporaries debated whether or not consumption of alcohol
increased during Prohibition, but the character of drinking was perceived to have
changed, to have become a flagrant act of defiance.
When the Eighteenth Amendment was sent to the states for ratification in 1919, it
was unclear if a majority of the country actually supported the Amendment. Chief
Justice William Howard Taft predicted that the Eighteenth Amendment would be
26 Behr, Prohibition, 89.
27 M ichael A. Lerner, Dry M a n h a tta n : Prohibition in N e w York (Cam bridge, MA: Harvard U niversity Press,
2007) 1, 48. Zeitz, Flapper, 98-103.
28 Kyvig, Daily Life, 25.
29 F. S cott Fitzgerald, The G re a t Gatsby (N ew York: Scribner, 1925). Flaming Youth, d irected by John
Francis Dillon (1923).
30 Part o f th e problem is th e difficulty in a ssessin g con su m p tio n w h en th e re is no record o f sales. D eaths
from cirrhosis o f th e liver d eclin ed during Prohibition, which indicates d ecr ea sed co n su m p tio n , but is not
probative. The W ickersham C om m ission felt th at drinking probably in creased, esp ecia lly by y o u n g p eo p le
and w o m en . National C om m ission on Law O bservance and E nforcem ent, A Report o f the N atio n al
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcem ent Relative to the Facts as to the Enforcement, the
Benefits, and the Abuses under the Prohibition Laws, both Before and Since the Adoption o f the Eighteenth
A m en dm ent to the C onstitution,! 1st Cong. 3 rd se ss., H ouse D ocu m en t No. 722. (G overnm en t Printing

Office: W ashington, 1931) 22.

10

incorporated into the Constitution, “against the views and practices of a majority of the
people in many of the large cities and in one-fourth or less of the States.”

His

prediction was realized. It is uncertain whether the Amendment would have been ratified
had there actually been a popular vote. Though ratification was successful; the
amendment was never submitted to a referendum. In fact, Ohio attempted to submit the
question to its citizens, and the United States Supreme Court found that this violated the
Constitution. Under Article V of the Constitution, Congress has the discretion to submit
an amendment for ratification by either state legislatures or conventions. The Eighteenth
Amendment was sent to state legislatures for ratification, not the citizens of the states.
And so, as Kyvig wrote, Prohibition began with an “image of a reform achieved by
undemocratic means.”

Whether or not the Amendment would have passed by popular

vote in each state, a significant minority of the population that disagreed as Volstead
went into effect.
There were practical reasons to disobey the law. The Volstead Act put thousands
out of work, with no provisions for employing the waiters, bartenders, saloon owners,
brewers, transporters, and warehouse owners who had made their living from the
manufacture, transportation, or sale of alcohol. In 1915, there were 1,345 breweries
operating in the United States.34 In 1913, liquor manufacturers employed 62,920 people;

31 National C om m ission on Law O bservance and E nforcem ent, Enforcem ent o f the Prohibition Laws:
O fficial Records o f the N a tio n a l Commission on Law Observance an d E nforcem ent Pertaining to Its
Investigation o f the Facts as to the Enforcement, the Benefits, and the Abuses under the Prohibition Laws,
both before an d since the Adoption o f the Eighteenth A m en dm ent to the Constitution, 7 1 st Cong., 3d. sess.,

S en ate D ocu m ent 307. 5 vols. (W ashington: G overn m ent Printing O ffice, 1931), vol. V, 201.
32 Haw ke v. Smith 253 U.S. 251 (1920).
33 Kyvig, Repealing, 14-16.
34 Martin Stack, "Local and Regional B rew eries in A m erica's Brewing Industry, 1865 to 1920" The Business
History Review, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Autum n, 20 00), 4 3 5 -4 6 3 , 449.
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there were 100,000 bartenders and 68,000 saloon keepers employed in 1910.

oc

While a

few wealthy people were affected, notably the owners of breweries, the economic burden
of Prohibition fell on the working class, who overwhelmingly opposed Prohibition.
Frank Duffy, the General Secretary of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
of America, estimated that more than 95 percent of workers “are opposed to these laws
and also to their enforcement, believing them to be a curtailment of their guaranteed
rights.”37 Daniel J. Tobin, General President of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers in Indianapolis, added that “the working people of
America... have a feeling that their freedom has been somewhat interfered with by
legislation.”

Not only did they disagree with Prohibition, but workers were most likely

to be arrested and charged with Prohibition violations. Edward Behr asserts that
“Prohibition agents concentrated their efforts on those they could not shake down; that is,
the poor, the barely literate, the recent immigrants least able to defend themselves.”
While he emphasized this “two-tier” justice as being a product of wealthy violators’
immunity to prosecution, it was also a deliberate attack on the lower class.

TQ

Many working class Americans saw Prohibition as a project of the wealthy to
control the poor, branding the lower class criminals while the upper class had cocktail
35 L. A m es Brown, "Econom ics o f Prohibition" The North Am erican Review, Vol. 203, No. 723 (Feb., 1916),
2 5 6-264, 263. D eets Pickett, "Prohibition and Econom ic Change" Annals o f the A m erican Academ y o f
Political and Social Science, Vol. 163, Prohibition: A National Experim ent (Sep., 1932) 9 8 -1 0 4 , 101.
36 A nnheuser-Busch d iversified and sold o ff or rented ou t real e s ta te to survive Prohibition; Pabst also
diversified, bought a soft drink com p any, and m erged with a m alt product corporation; Schlitz sold o ff tw o
th ou san d properties. O ver half o f th e b rew ers op eratin g in 19 1 8 clo sed . The o n e s th at survived had
am ple cash reserves to diversify. M aureen Ogle, Ambitious Brew: The Story o f Am erican Beer (Orlando,
FI.: Harcourt, 2006) 18 3 -1 8 8 . In a n ational Literary Digest poll in 1922, w orkingm en favored m odification
o f th e V olstead Act by m ore than nine to o n e. Larry Engelman, "Organized Thirst: The Story of Repeal in
Michigan," in Alcohol, Reform an d Society: The Liquor Issue in Social Context, Jack S. Blocker, Jr., ed.
(W estport, Conn.: G reen w ood Press, 1979) 1 7 1 -2 1 0 ,1 7 2 .
37 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 3, 290.
38 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 3, 274.
39 Behr, Prohibition, 241.
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parties. In Profits, Power, and Prohibition, John J. Rumbarger found that “the liquor
question itself was the ideological creation of America’s dominant social class seeking to
expand its hegemony over the lives of the country’s propertyless masses.”40 The
wealthiest members of society did not feel the effects of Prohibition as strongly because
they simply ignored the law. William Stayton, member o f the Association Against the
Prohibition Amendment, wrote that “the workman has long believed that the campaign
for national prohibition was financed by the employer for the purpose of increasing
output.”41 Rumbarger demonstrated that this was true. According to Allen, “among the
prosperous classes which set the standards of national social behavior, alcohol flowed
more freely than ever before.”42 When prices of alcohol increased 500 to 600 percent,
the wealthy could afford the increase.43 The laws were strictly enforced in ethnic and
working-class communities, while the wealthy could join an exclusive club, pay off
enforcement officers, and hire an effective litigator in the rare instances that they were
targeted.44
These ideological rationales helped to reinforce the disparity in impact on
different economic and social classes. Michael A. Lemer described Prohibition as a
“fourteen-year-long cultural conflict over the nature of American identity.”45 While the
mostly Anglo/white upper class supported or rejected Prohibition easily, ethnic and racial
minorities viewed the dry movement as a “crusade in bigotry.”46 Dry crusaders spoke

40 Rumbarger, Profits, Power, an d Prohibition, 188.
41 W. H. Stayton, "Our Experim ent in National Prohibition. W hat Progress Has It M ade?" Annals o f the
Am erican A cadem y o f Political an d Social Science, Vol. 109, Prohibition and Its E n forcem en t (Sep., 1923),
26-38, 31.
42 Allen, Only Yesterday, 96.
43 Kyvig, Daily Life, 22.
44 Lemer, Dry M a n h a tta n , 110-112.
45 Lerner, Dry M a n h a tta n , 3.
46 Lerner, Dry M a n h a tta n , 30, 3.
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and wrote in anti-immigrant rhetoric, blasting German breweries, Jewish and Italian
wine-drinking, and Irish whiskey. They never effectively distanced themselves from this
bigotry.47 According to Lynn Dumenil, the problems of “crime, prostitution, and
violations of prohibition” became “associated in the old-stock mind with immigrants and
African Americans.” She described the impetus for the passage of the Eighteenth
Amendment as “inseparable from the nativism and anti-Catholicism deeply embedded in
nineteenth-century political culture.” By the twentieth century, the “battle for
prohibition” had become “an ethnic conflict.” She describes prohibitionists as
“overwhelmed by immigrant masses whose religion, language, values - especially of
sexual morality, drink, and leisure - seemed so much at odds with mainstream values.”
Dry crusaders hoped that the Volstead Act would “coerce assimilation” to “Protestant
middle-class values.”

AO

Even if ethnic and racial minorities chose to not obey the law,

Joseph Gusfield wrote, it was these crusaders’ “culture that had to be evaded... and
morality that was transgressed.”49 Ethnic and racial Americans fully comprehended the
Prohibition law and its enforcement as an attempt to “police the habits o f the poor, the
foreign-born, and the working class.”50 Resistance to what they viewed as an attempt to
annihilate their culture took many forms, but “resistance to the dry laws became a form of
protest against the cultural authority of Protestant drys who presented themselves as the
defenders of all things genuinely American.”51 Flouting Prohibition, ethnic Americans
“asserted their own identity” in the face of “the ultimate nativist reform.”

47 Lerner, "Brewers o f Bigotry," Dry M a n h a tta n , 9 6 -1 2 6 .
48 Dum enil, M odern Tem per, 239, 227-8.
49 Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, 122.
50 Lerner, Dry M a n h a tta n , 96.
51 Lerner, Dry M a n h a tta n , 100.
52 Dum enil, M odern Temper, 30.
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Americans, the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act were invading not just their
physical home, but attacking and intruding on their cultural identity and the expression of
that identity.
Many Americans saw the Amendment as an intrusion on their personal life
choices, whether those choices were linked specifically to cultural identity or simply
freedom. Underlying the unpopularity of the act was the nature of the Eighteenth
Amendment itself. It is the only Constitutional amendment that is framed in terms of a
prohibition, not a right.53 And because of this, people saw the law itself as invading their
privacy. This sentiment was widespread across society. In 1922, Fabian Franklin
published What Prohibition Has Done to America. Once a professor of mathematics at
Johns Hopkins University and then associate editor of The New York Evening Post,
Franklin presented the Eighteenth Amendment as a “Constitutional monstrosity” and a
“degradation of the Constitution.”54 Working men voiced similar opinions - that “their
freedom has been somewhat interfered with by legislation,” that the laws and their
enforcement were “a curtailment of their guaranteed rights under the Bill of Rights and
other sections of the Constitution,” and that it “infringes on personal liberty.”55
Wickersham Commission member Henry W. Anderson wrote in his addendum to the
official Report that citizens “feel that the present law attempted too much - went too far

53 W hile th e Thirteenth and F ourteenth A m en d m en ts effectiv ely circum scribed citizens' actions, th e y are
fram ed in term s o f granting rights.
54 Fabian Franklin, W h a t Prohibition Has Done to Am erica (N ew York: Harcourt, Brace, and Com pany,
1922) 9, 11.
55 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 3, 2 7 3 -2 7 4 (Daniel J. Tobin, th e G eneral President o f th e International
B rotherhood o f T eam sters, C hauffeurs, and Helpers). NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 3 2 9 0 (Frank Duffy,
General Secretary o f th e U nited B roth erhood o f Carpenters and Joiners). NCLOE, Enforcem ent, m o \. 3, 261
(Adolph J. Fritz, Secretary o f th e Indiana S tate Federation o f Labor).
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in its invasion of personal rights.”56 The law’s “impairment of constitutional guarantees
of individual rights” was part of the declaration of the Women’s Organization for
*

National Prohibition Reform at their first convention.

57

According to David Kyvig, the

Eighteenth Amendment brought “the federal government into people’s daily lives in a
fashion never before experienced in peacetime.”

co

Not only did the law seem to reach invisibly into people’s homes, but the
Prohibition agents physically infringed on people’s liberty. In its incorporation statement
the Volunteer Committee for Lawyers, an organization of lawyers dedicated to the repeal
of the Eighteenth Amendment, reasoned that national Prohibition had allowed the
government to resort to “improper and illegal acts in the procurement of evidence and
infringement of such constitutional guarantees as immunity from double jeopardy and
illegal search and seizure.”59 These concerns were not unfounded. William S. Kenyon, a
member of the Wickersham Commission, wrote that “public sentiment against the
prohibition laws has been stimulated by irritating methods of enforcement, such as the
abuse of search and seizure processes, invasion of homes and violations o f the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution, entrapment of witnesses, [and] killings by prohibition
agents.”60 Wickersham Committee member Paul J. McCormick went further, calling the
Bureau’s enforcement methods “fanatical, illegal, and corrupt.”61 Kyvig describes law

56 NCLOE, Report, 91. The N ational C om m ission on Law O bservance and E nforcem ent w as called th e
"W ickersham C om m ission." This w as a S en a te C om m ission tasked in 193 1 w ith in vestigatin g "the
en fo rcem en t, th e b en efits, and th e ab u ses under th e Prohibition laws."
57 Kyvig, Repealing N a tio n a l Prohibition, 123 (citing Transcript, WONPR first co n v en tio n , WONPR Papers. W om en 's Organization for N ational Prohibition Reform Papers, in Alice Belin du Pont files, Pierre S. du
Pont Papers. Eleutherian Mills Historical Library. W ilm ington, DE).
58 Kyvig, Daily Life, 3.
59 Kyvig, Repealing N a tio n a l Prohibition, 128 (citing Voluntary C o m m ittee for Lawyers' incorporation
sta te m e n t published in N e w York H erald-Tribune on January 23, 1929).
60 NCLOE, Report, 120-122.
61 NCLOE, Report, 155.
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enforcement during the Prohibition years as “more aggressive and intrusive” and
“assuming new powers.”62 A 1927 article in the Yale Law Journal found that “more than
700 cases involving the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence [had been] reported”
since 1920. “The number of liquor cases turning upon the rule ha[d] increased from four
during the first year [of Prohibition] to more than 220 during the past year.”63
Often search warrants were granted based on dubious information, even on the
basis of a mere anonymous tip or perjured testimony.64 Roy Haynes recounts a story of
two Prohibition agents who threatened to shoot an unarmed teenager in their custody.
Three women were about to attack the agents with an iron bar, a rolling pin, and “a bit of
rough lumber.” They ceased their attack to save the life of the boy.65 In the investigation
and arrest of George Remus, a federal agent entered Remus’s hotel suite in Columbus,
Ohio, inserted a microphone in the wall, and proceeded to transcribe everything that
happened in the room.66 Major Maurice E. Campbell, Prohibition Administrator for the
Eastern District of New York, recounted raiding a club without a warrant and destroying
all of the furniture inside - he termed this “confiscating” the property - which was
allowed if the person had not paid taxes on the liquor they sold.

f\

7

In 1931, the Chief,

Division of Schools, Bureau of Prohibition, described “a lack o f knowledge combined
with the inexperience of many of the officers” resulting in ... illegal searches and
seizures. ,,68

62 Kyvig, Repealing N a tio n a l Prohibition, 35.
63 O sm ond K. Fraenkel, "R ecent D ev elo p m en ts in th e Law o f Search and Seizure," 13 Minn. L. Rev. 1
(1928).
64 Rose, Am erican W om en and the Repeal o f Prohibition, 49-50.
65 Haynes, Prohibition Inside Out, 26-27.
6666 Behr, Prohibition, 168.
67 Kobler, A rd ent Spirits, 236-7.
68 Harry M. Dengler, "Training o f Prohibition E nforcem ent O fficers in th e U nited States" The Am erican
Journal o f Police Science, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jan-Feb., 1931) 45-51, 1.
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In addition to questionable searches, seizures, and arrests, Prohibition
enforcement took its toll on civilian and enforcement personnel. The reported number of
civilian and federal officers killed “incidental to operations” in enforcing the Volstead
Act was 286 from 1920-1930.69 It is nearly impossible to estimate the number of
civilians killed by state and local officials; estimates range from eight hundred to thirteen
hundred people. Many of these civilian deaths were due to the incompetence of the
agents. Explanations for individual killings included poor aim at a tire, tripping, or the
suspicion that the civilian was carrying a weapon. Some were even shot in the back
while fleeing.70 As an example of these acts of “self-defense: “An Agent Rudolph
Brewer attempted to arrest seventy-year old Charles Gundlacht. Gundlacht fired at
Brewer, wounding his knee. Brewer fired back and hit Gundlacht’s foot. “As he lay on
the ground begging for mercy, Brewer stood over him and put a bullet through his
head.”71
These violations of the Constitution were due in large part to the inexperience and
ineffectiveness of the federal agents of the Prohibition Bureau who were charged with
enforcing the Prohibition laws. Originally under the aegis of the Treasury Department,
the Bureau was consistently understaffed, its agents underpaid, underqualified and often
corrupt. For these reasons, the turnover rate within the Bureau was extraordinarily high,
further eroding its efficiency. The Bureau’s mandate - to stop the sale and trafficking of
liquor throughout the United States - was impossible given these circumstances. This
became more apparent, and in 1931 President Herbert Hoover appointed the National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (the “Wickersham Commission” or
69 NCLOE, Enforcement, 491.
70 NCLOE, Enforcement, 4 9 1 -5 1 5 .
71Kobler, A rdent Spirits, 2 8 8 -2 8 9 . For m ore a n ecd o tes, s e e 2 8 9 -2 9 4 .
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NCLOE) to investigate problems of law enforcement in general, and specifically the
Volstead Act.72
The Prohibition Bureau was created in 1921 with an appropriation of 6.35 million
dollars; by 1924 its appropriation had increased to 8.25 million dollars, and 12.7 million
dollars by 1930.73 This funding could not support enough personnel, nor could it
adequately compensate those who did work for the agency.75 The 1931 Wickersham
Commission investigation found that “the activities of the bureau have been cut to fit a
sum established at Washington rather than fit the known requirements of the task to be
accomplished.”

nn

The Wickersham Commission finally recommended “substantial

increase” in federal appropriations.

78

In 1924, 1,652 agents were assigned to patrol the entire United States, over 3.5
million square miles and a population of just over 106 million people.

oA

While Congress

expected that local agencies would also investigate and prosecute offenders, it was still
geographically impossible for this number of men to patrol even the United States’
borders, much the less its interior. As Allen put it: “If the whole army of agents in 1920
had been mustered along the coasts and borders - paying no attention at the moment to
medicinal alcohol, breweries, industrial alcohol, or illicit stills - there would have been
one man to patrol every twelve miles of beach, harbor, headland, forest, and riverfront.”81

72 W hile scholars d isagree on th e m erits o f th e final Report o f th e C om m ission, th e research and data that
w as collected is useful in detailing th e Prohibition ex p erien ce and th e s e d o cu m e n ts will b e u sed to
support th e co n ten tio n s put forth in this paper. Doek-H o Kim, '"A H ouse Divided:' The W ickersham
C om m ission and N ational Prohibition," PhD diss., S tate University o f N ew York at Stony Brook, 1992.
73 NCLOE, Enforcement, Vol. 2, 21 6 -2 9 1 .
7S NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 5, 452.
77 NCLOE, Enforcement, Vol. 2 ,1 2 8 .
78 NCLOE, Report, 83.
80 h ttp ://w w w .c e n su s .g o v /h isto r y /w w w /th r o u g h _ th e _ d e c a d e s/fa st_ fa c ts/1 9 2 0 _ fa st_ fa c ts.h tm l, a ccessed
20 February 2011. NCLOE, Enforcement, Vol. 2, 208.
81 Allen, Only Yesterday, 216.
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It was just not mathematically possible for this small force to succeed if significant
numbers of people violated the Act. Anderson wrote in his addendum to the report, “If
the people.. .send into action for its enforcement.. .a small force of from 1,000 to 1,500
underpaid men against a lawless army running into tens of thousands, possessed of
financial resources amounting to billions, ready to buy protection at any cost, the people
must expect unsatisfactory results and heavy moral casualties.”

ft?

When the Wickersham Commission published its Report, it recommended
increasing the number of agents in the Bureau by 60 percent.

R4

This report was published

in 1931, when number of agents working for the Bureau had been increased to over
2,500.85 Agents were not only overwhelmed by the vastness of the country, but also the
scope of the responsibilities delegated to the Prohibition Bureau. These included
“policing the nation’s borders for illegal smuggling; making raids and arrests for alcohol
sales; licensing the manufacture, storage, and distribution of industrial alcohol; regulating
the supply of medicinal alcohol; and monitoring the dispensation of sacramental wine.”

o/r

As Allen illustrated, there were barely enough agents to monitor the borders. Lemer
noted that the Bureau was the “largest rionmilitary federal law enforcement body in the
country,” but the prevalence of alcohol and widespread violation of the law made the size
07

of the Bureau inadequate to effectively enforce the law.
As Wickersham Commission member Henry Anderson alluded, the agents of the
Prohibition Bureau were also underpaid for this difficult and often dangerous work. “The
agents’ salaries in 1920 mostly ranged between $1,200 and $2,000 [below the mean
82 NCLOE, Report, 12, 16, 97. S e e also Kobler, A rd e n t Spirits, 271.
84 NCLOE, Report, 64-65.
85 NCLOE, Enforcement , 208.
86 Lemer, Dry M a n h a tta n , 64.
87 Lemer, Dry M a n h a tta n , 65.
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income of $2,500].88 Again, Allen’s eloquence is striking: “Anybody who believed that
men employable at thirty-five or forty or fifty dollars a week would surely have the
expert technical knowledge and the diligence to supervise successfully the complicated
chemical operations of industrial alcohol plants or to outwit the craftiest devices of
smugglers and bootleggers, and that they would surely have the force of character to
resist corruption by men whose pockets were bulging with money, would be ready to
OQ

believe in Santa Claus, perpetual motion, and pixies.”

The salary was not high enough

to attract people qualified for the technical aspects of the job or experienced in law
enforcement and investigation. The agents were paid far less than the average American,
yet were expected to resist when presented with ways to offset their meager income.
The Wickersham Commission Report attributed the low caliber of men that
applied to work for the Bureau to these low salaries. “The salaries of prohibition agents
were too low to be attractive. There has been much criticism of the character,
intelligence, and ability of many of the force originally appointed.”91 The agents were
often unqualified to perform law enforcement tasks. On April 1, 1930, according to the
Wickersham Commission, “half the present force were [sic] totally inexperienced in
police or investigative work.”92 It was not until after 1926 that the Prohibition Bureau
became subject to civil service testing. When active Prohibition agents were subjected to

88 The majority o f th e a g en ts in 1920 (839 o f 943) w er e paid b e tw e e n $ 1 ,2 0 0 and $ 2 ,0 0 0 per annum .
NCLOE, Report, 12, 16. The N ew York Police D epartm ent, also w ith a repu tation for corruption, paid its
officers an average annual salary o f $ 1 ,9 0 0 . Lemer, Dry M a n h a tta n , 82.
89 Allen, Only Yesterday, 216.
91 NCLOE, Report, 12. In 1926, G eorge W ickersham testified to th e S en a te C om m ittee th a t "the character
o f th e p ersonn el in m any re sp ects w as very undesirable." S en a te C o m m ittee on th e Judiciary,
Investigation o f Prohibition Enforcement, 7 1 st Cong., 2nd se ss., 1930, 211, 3.
92 NCLOE, Enforcement, Vol. 2, 3 3 n l0 .
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their first civil service exam, 70 percent of the examinees flunked.

93

i

•

Prior to that time

cronyism placed men in positions for which they were unqualified. Lemer described
some of the first appointees in New York City as “dishwashers, baseball players, boxing
managers, shopkeepers, and returning veterans.”94 These agents obtained their positions
through their political connections, as a reward for service to the party. Others were
given positions became of their dedication to the temperance movement. Henry S.
Dennison, Wickersham Committee member, characterized these appointees as “a
combination of fanatics and crooks.”95 Agents Izzy Einstein and Moe Smith arrested
five-thousand violators in the five years they worked, a full fifth of the prohibition cases
prosecuted in New York City up to 1926, yet they were fired because they were making
their coworkers look incompetent.96
That the agents were underpaid and underqualified contributed to corruption
within the Bureau. George Wickersham commented, to a 1926 Senate Committee
investigating law enforcement: “When you...[consider] that the extraordinary temptation
to which very ordinary men, men of very ordinary caliber, put into positions for which
they had no previous training, were subjected, I think it is a remarkable thing not so much
QO

that there was corruption, but that there was any limit to the corruption.”

A culture of

graft surrounded all of Prohibition enforcement. The agents saw their quarries living a
lifestyle that made their already low government pay seem paltry. A police officer or

93 Kobler, A rdent Spirits, 279. The Prohibition Bureau did not require civil service exam in ation s until June
4 ,1 9 2 7 . Only 4 ,5 0 4 p a ssed th e exam in ation , approxim ately one-third o f th o s e taking it. Of th e se , 2 ,52 6
w ere declared ineligible for character, p ersonality or fitn ess. (NCLOE, Enforcement, Vol. 2, 17-28, 228).
94 Lerner, Dry M a n h a tta n , 66.
95 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 2, 61.
96 Kobler, A rd ent Spirits , 2 9 4 -2 9 5 . Einstein and Smith w er e also a ccu sed o f flagrant C onstitutional
violations, but this w as n ot th e reason for their dism issal. Coffey, The Long Thirst, 99.
98 S en ate C om m ittee on th e Judiciary, Investigation o f Prohibition Enforcem ent, 10-11.
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Prohibition agent could increase their income by 25 percent by collecting only five
dollars a week from just one person or establishment. The actual graft amounts collected
were often far more. In New York City, the going rate for tipping off a liquor dealer or
saloon owner was from fifty dollars to five hundred dollars." In Philadelphia, policemen
were paid monthly “salaries” by the liquor interests dependent on their rank: seventyfive dollars to district captains, fifty dollars to district detectives, and twenty-five dollars
to street sergeants.100 If the payment was made to ignore a large-scale transaction the
amount offered could be 20,000 dollars or more.101 One Agent Kerrigan estimated that
an agent could easily increase his income to between 40,000 and 50,000 dollars a year.102
The temptation was too much for many to withstand, as Wickersham noted to the Senate
Committee: “It is putting an undue strain on an every-day sort of individual to put him in
a position where he has got a salary large enough to enable him to live with a family in
ordinarily decent circumstances and expose him to the temptation that by turning his back
he can obtain a sum large enough to keep him in comfort.” 103
Just because the temptation existed, it doesn’t necessarily mean that agents were
corrupted. But the records of the Prohibition Bureau prove otherwise. Edward Behr, in
Prohibition: Thirteen Years that Changed America, broke down the corruption
numerically: between 1920 and 1930, some 11,926 agents (out of a force of 17,816) were
‘separated without prejudice’ [from the Bureau] because their criminal involvement could
not be proved, and another 1,587 were ‘dismissed with cause.’” 104 Tip offs to criminals

99 Lerner, Dry M a n h a tta n , 68, 82.
100 NCLOE, Enforcement, Vol. 5, 205.
101 Lerner, Dry M a n h a tta n , 69.
102 Kobler, A rd ent Spirits, 277.
103 S en a te C om m ittee on th e Judiciary, Investigation o f Prohibition Enforcem ent, 10-11.
104 Behr, Prohibition, 153.
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and speakeasy owners were so common in the New York City office of the Bureau, that it
cut its outgoing telephone service when a raid was about to be initiated “to stop tips from
being phoned out by agents on the take.”105 John Kobler, in Ardent Spirits: The Rise and
Fall o f Prohibition, noted that, from 1920-1930, almost 12 percent of persons who
worked for the bureau were dismissed for cause.106
Mabel Walker Willebrandt, an Assistant Attorney General for the United States
from 1921 to 1929, was in a unique position to observe the enforcement of the Volstead
Act. After she left office, she wrote The Inside o f Prohibition as a way to convey to the
public her perspective on the ineffectiveness of enforcement. She wrote of the problems
in enforcement due in part to the corruption within the Prohibition Bureau: “In the six
years from 1920 to 1926 more than seven hundred and fifty prohibition agents were
dismissed from the force for delinquency or misconduct. Among the charges which were
brought were extortion, bribery, solicitation of money, illegal disposition o f liquor or
other property, intoxication, assault, the making of false reports, and theft. Sixty-one
other officers and employees were dismissed for acts of collusion or conspiracy to violate
the very law they had sworn to protect!”

t
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The Senate noted in 1931 that corruption was

improved over time by the “continuous sifting out” of corrupt agents, “giving the
employees a better status under the civil service,” and “by giving them better
compensation.”

1OR

But the ineffectiveness that accompanied the corruption damaged the

public reputation of the Bureau early in Prohibition; improvement could not change the
lingering impression that the Bureau was corrupt, inefficient, and ineffective.

105 Lerner, Dry M a n h a tta n , 68, 69.
106 Kobler, A rd ent Spirits, 277.
107 M abel W alker W illebrant, The Inside o f Prohibition (Indianapolis: Bobbs-M errill C om pany, 1929) 111.
108 S en a te C om m ittee on th e Judiciary, Investigation o f Prohibition Enforcem ent, 10.
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There are many individual instances of shocking corruption that contributed to
this impression. A Philadelphia Prohibition director, in 1921, helped remove seven
hundred thousand gallons of whiskey, with a street value of four million dollars, from
government-bonded warehouses. His case was discharged when the evidence
disappeared.109 A congressman in Pittsburgh served a jail sentence for allowing four
thousand cases of bonded whiskey to fall into the hands of bootleggers. He was reelected
with the help of the Anti-Saloon League because of his dry voting record.110 A federal
grand jury in Pittsburgh indicted: two police magistrates, two legislators, five ward
chairmen, the superintendant of police, fourteen police inspectors, five patrolmen and one
constable.111 Lemer chronicles other instances: the Bureau’s “administrator of Chicago
and its chief agent in 1923; its director for Ohio in 1925; in 1927 its former administrator
of Buffalo, his former assistant, and several agents active and retired; its deputy
administrator of Fayetteville, North Carolina, and six agents, its former chief of the New
York Druggist Permit Division.”

i1

While anecdotal, these instances make clear that

corruption ran throughout the Bureau - from agent, to administrator, to director.
The difficulty of the job, the low pay, the corruption - all of this contributed to the
excessive amount of turnover in the Prohibition Bureau. Between 1920 and 1925 the
lowest rate of turnover was 14.83 percent of personnel; the highest was 76.15 percent.

1 1o

The Wickersham Commission found that “no organization could function efficiently and

109 Behr, Prohibition, 153.
110 Behr, Prohibition, 154.
111 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 5, 211-2.
112Kobler, A rd ent Spirits, 274..
113 NCLOE, Report, 16. NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 2, 206. The
74.55% ; 1922 - 47.36% ; 1923 - 47.69% , and 1 9 2 4 - 28.80% .
this w ith th e 3% turnover in th e S ecret Service in 1 9 2 9 -1 9 3 0 .
a turnover of 28.01% (NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 2, 206, 213);

exact n um bers o f turnover are: 19 2 1 (NCLOE, Enforcem ent, vol. 2, 206). Com pare
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harmoniously in such a state of upheaval, with its leadership continually shifting and its
plan of field organization subject to constant revision.”114 For comparison, in 1929-1930
the Prohibition Bureau had a turnover of 28.01 percent, while the Secret Service was 3
percent in the same year and post-office inspectors 2.47 percent.115
The ineffectiveness of the Bureau caused by corruption was compounded by the
lack of assistance from other law enforcement agencies. There was an expectation at the
outset that the Bureau agents would be helped in their monumental task by “local law
enforcement agencies, the Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, and other
agencies.” 116 The help that Congress had predicted or expected when it enacted Volstead
was not forthcoming. Federal agencies that were expected to cooperate were specifically
the Coast Guard, Customs, and the Department of Justice. The first two were “organized
for a totally different purpose from the prevention o f the inflow of liquor... and not
•
* the problem of prohibition.” 117 Allen describes these agencies’
anxious
to be drawn into
assistance as “unenthusiastic.”

1 18

The Department of Justice was obligated to prosecute

these cases investigated by the Bureau, but was continually frustrated in its efforts to
secure convictions. The corruption in the Bureau and illegal methods used by agents led
to evidence being excluded, witnesses unable to testify, and the impeachment of
testimony by untrustworthy Bureau agents. The Bureau agents rendered many cases
unwinnable.
The Coast Guard had the same issues o f graft that seemed to surround everything
to do with Prohibition. Coast Guard captain Frank J. Stuart was paid two thousand
114 NCLOE, Report, 16, 64, 97.
115 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 2, 206, 213.
116 Lerner, Dry M a n h a tta n , 65. Allen, Only Yesterday,218.
117 S en a te C om m ittee on th e Judiciary, Investigation o f Prohibition Enforcement, 12.
118 Allen, Only Yesterday, 2 1 7 -2 1 8 .
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dollars for letting liquor boats land near Montauk.119 The Coast Guard struggled to
enforce Prohibition laws. International maritime law set a three-mile boundary: outside
of this the Coast Guard did not have jurisdiction over a vessel, unless that ship was in
contact with shore.

ion

Generally this meant that unless the Coast Guard actually saw

small boats pulling up to the large ships that were essentially floating warehouses, they
did not have jurisdiction to board the vessel, impound it, or seize the cargo. In addition,
most of the smaller boats that carried the alcohol to shore were faster than the Coast
Guard ships, with locally experienced captains that could, given a small headstart, easily
outrun the Coast Guard. As late as 1931, government officials were noticing the
underequipped Coast Guard vessels, recommending an “increase in mechanical
equipment such as: (a) Radios for the interception of the smugglers’ messages, and (b)
airplanes for scouting purposes;” they also recommended “faster boats” and silencing
devices.” 121
Like the Prohibition Bureau, Customs officials were woefully understaffed to deal
with importation of liquor. In 1926, Customs had only one hundred seventy patrolmen
for the entire length of the land borders with Canada and Mexico.122 These agents were
expected to halt what the Department of Commerce estimated was forty million dollars
worth of liquor entering the country.123 General Lincoln C. Andrews, appointed

119 Behr, Prohibition , 143.
120 This law changed to ap proxim ately tw e lv e to tw e n ty m iles o ffsh o re, or an hour's sail. Jam es Barbican,
Confessions o f a Rum -Runner (M ystic, CT: Flat Ham m ock Press, 20 0 7 ) 125. For m ore on Rum Row and th e

Coast Guard, s e e Harold W alters, Smugglers o f Spirits: Prohibition an d the Coast Guard Patrol (M ystic, CT:
Flat Ham m ock Press, 2 0 0 7 and Robert Carse, Rum Row: The Liquor Fleet th a t Fueled the Roaring Twenties
(Mystic, CT: Flat Ham m ock Press, 2007). For m ore on Rum Row generally, s e e Alastair Moray, The Diary
o f a Rum -Runner (M ystic, CT: Flat Ham m ock Press, 20 0 7 ) and Frederic F. Van d e W ater, The Real McCoy
(M ystic, CT: Flat Ham m ock Press, 2007).
121 NCLOE, Enforcem ent , vol. 2, 1 8 6 ,1 8 9 .
122 NCLOE, Report, 13-14.
123 Allen, Only Yesterday, 2 1 7 -2 1 8 .
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Assistant Secretary of the Treasury assigned in 1925 to supervise Customs, Coast Guard,
and Prohibition, estimated that he would need a force of at least 1,500 agents to
adequately patrol both borders.124 And, again, corruption was a problem. United States
Attorney John R. Watkins led a 1931 investigation into Customs officials in Detroit that
was expected to bring indictments against one hundred Customs agents. This had
happened before in Detroit, when in one year 175 men were fired. There were only 129
inspectors working in Detroit; this was a turnover of more than 135 percent. Watkins
estimated that one half of the liquor smuggled from Canada was done so with the help of
Customs inspectors, who were collecting approximately 1,700 dollars per month in
bribes. 126
As one particular example of non-cooperation, in Florida, there were forty-four
fruit fly quarantine stations, all federal, though often operated by state officials. All
vehicles that passed through the station were searched for fruit that might carry the
Mediterranean fruit fly out of Florida. Customs officials “reported instances of car
seizures, involving large quantities of contraband [liquor] that had been previously
*

searched and passed with a Government seal by fruit-fly inspectors.”

joo

Here, it would

have been quite simple and effective for the quarantine stations to arrest and/or seize the
liquor in transport, but it was not done.
Before the Prohibition Bureau was relocated to the Department of Justice, the
Treasury Department investigated offenses and the Department of Justice prosecuted the
offenders. Attorney General Mitchell pushed for the move, saying that it would “make a

^ NCLOE, Report , 13-14.
126 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 5, 213-4.
128 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 4, 120.
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closer coordination between the detection and the prosecution” of these offenses. 129
Prohibition agents would pursue a criminal with little thought of ensuring a successful
prosecution. They were, as already noted, untrained. Cases were often dismissed
because the agents did not follow Constitutional procedures in investigating and arresting
violators.130 Lemer writes of one effect of this misconduct: “Any time an arresting
police officer or Prohibition agent was dismissed from the force, prosecutors quickly
dropped all pending cases involving the implicated officer... The United States
Attorney’s office was forced to dismiss cases because evidence had been improperly or
illegally seized, or, on occasion, because evidence and case files had disappeared from
the Bureau of Prohibition headquarters.” 131 The Department of Justice and the federal
court system felt the heavy burden of the Prohibition law. If every violator “arrested
during a single m onth... demanded a jury trial, every federal judge available for
prohibition cases would be occupied for a year.” 132 Even though this scenario did not
actually occur, the case load nevertheless began to overwhelm the federal courts.
Volstead violations were 65 percent of the federal cases heard in the 1920s. In 1921, the
federal courts handled 29,114 cases of prohibition violation. In 1932, it was 65,960. By
1930, 49 percent o f federal prisoners were there for Volstead violations; up from 7
percent in the early 1920s.134 Prosecutors often used their discretion to not take cases to

129 S en a te C om m ittee on th e Judiciary, Investigation o f Prohibition Enforcem ent, 31.
130 Kyvig, Repealing N a tio n a l Prohibition, 35.
131 Lerner, Dry M a n h a tta n , 91. S ee also, Kyvig, Repealing N a tio n a l Prohibition, 35.
132 Kobler, A rd ent Spirits, 283.
134 Kyvig, Daily Life, 178.
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trial that they deemed trivial or likely unwinnable because o f search and seizure issues or
suggestions of corruption.

IOC

Successful enforcement of Prohibition also required coordination with foreign
nations. Prior to Prohibition, Great Britain and Canada had exported substantial amounts
of alcohol to the United States. It was not in their best financial interest to cease
exportation and lose the profits from American purchasers, but politically it was essential
to maintain at least an appearance of respect for American laws. British alcohol was
rerouted to the Bahamas or Bermuda or Canada. These Caribbean island nations, and
some Canadian islands like St. Pierre and Miquelon, suddenly became warehouses for
British liquor ultimately destined for the United States.

From there, the liquor was

transported to Florida or the infamous Rum Row off the Eastern seaboard of the United
States and then onto American shores. Captain Bunting, a rumrunner operating out of
Nassau, described the system: “We get the stuff shipped out from England to Nassau in
the ordinary way. It is paid for and the Bahamas Government gets the duty it imposes.
We employ labour in the island and we have brought prosperity to a poverty-stricken
place. We unload it from the big boats and load it up again on rum-runners like mine. It
goes up off the American coast, breaking no American or English law, for we keep in
international waters.”

100

Indeed, many Bahamians became wealthy from American

135 Lerner, Dry M a n h a tta n , 87. The plea bargain sy stem b eca m e a m ainstay o f th e fed era l cou rts during
Prohibition. Judges w ould o fte n have "bargain days" to help clear their d o ck ets w h e r e d efen d a n ts could
plead guilty, pay a fine, and avoid jail tim e , Kobler, A rd ent Spirits, 283.
135 For inform ation on Great Britain, th e Baham as, and Prohibition, s e e G ertrude "Cleo" Lythgoe, The
B aham a Queen: Prohibition's Daring Beauty (M ystic, CT: Flat Ham m ock Press, 2 0 0 7 . Also a b o u t th e
Baham as, and including inform ation on St. Pierre, is H. De W inton W igley, W ith the Whiskey Smugglers in
G ertrude "Cleo" Lythgoe, The B aham a Queen: Prohibition's Daring Beauty (M ystic, CT: Flat Ham mock
Press, 2007). Originally published by Daily N ew s Ltd, London, in 1 9 23. For th e e ffe c ts o f th e eig h teen th
a m en d m en t on diplom acy w ith Great Britain, s e e Lawrence Spinelli, Dry Diplomacy: The U nited States,
G reat Britain, an d Prohibition (Lanham, MD: Rowm an and Littlefied Publishers, 2 0 08).
138 W igley, W ith the Whiskey Smugglers, in Lythgoe, The B aham a Queen, 31.
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Prohibition. Individuals could make vast fortunes in a short amount of time - Roland T.
Symmonette made 1 million dollars in three years; this rumrunner became the first
Bahamian premier in 1964. The Bahamian government also reaped the benefits: revenue
from liquor imports and re-exports went from 81,049 pounds in 1919 to 1,065,899
pounds in 1923.139 According to Daniel Okrent, this revenue “brought Nassauvians into
the twentieth century. After the completion of a sewage system, a 2,300-volt generator, a
modem wharf..., a newly dredged harbor, and miles of resurfaced roads and streets..
the colony’s British governor, Sir Bede Clifford, said it would be appropriate to erect
near the statues of Christopher Columbus and Queen Victoria a third one: a monument to
Andrew J. Volstead.” 140
Great Britain also continued to export to Canada, where the liquor was redirected
to American buyers. How this liquor and Canadian alcohol reached the United States
depended upon the law in the particular Canadian province where the alcohol was held.
Canada was experimenting with legislating control of alcohol contemporaneously with
the United States. Instead of national prohibition, Canada developed a system like the
local option laws that had preceded Prohibition in the United States, whereby each
province voted on its own legislative schema. Two territories, Prince Edward Island and
Nova Scotia, were under self-imposed Prohibition. In the other seven, government
controlled the sale of alcohol. In Saskatchewan, Ontario, and New Brunswick the
government maintained a monopoly on the sale of all alcohol - “sold only in sealed
packages at Government stores and may not be consumed in a public place.” British
Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, and Quebec had the same system for hard liquor but not
139 M ichael Craton and Gail Saunders, Islanders in the Stream : A History o f The B aham ian People, vol. 2
(A thens, GA: University o f Georgia Press, 1998) 240, 23 8 .
140 Daniel Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall o f Prohibition (N ew York: Scribner, 2 0 1 0 ) 160.
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beer or wine, which was purchased by the glass at licensed taverns, beer parlors or (in
Quebec) shops.141 British Columbia allowed, until 1928, for private importation.143
There was no restriction in Canadian law on selling liquor to persons within the United
States. The only impediment to exporting to the United States was the government
excise tax, and an a 20 dollar surcharge imposed on alcohol destined for the United
States. According to Canadian records, in 1921 whiskey exports to the United States
were 8,335 gallons; by 1928, whiskey exports had reached 1,169,002 gallons.145 In 1921,
195,498 gallons of malt liquor were exported to the United States; in 1927, the total was
3,888,815 gallons.146 Foreign-made liquors were also re-exported from Canada to the
United States. In 1920, only 127 gallons of spirits were re-exported; in 1928, it was
243,305 gallons.147 In 1919 the value of all imported liquor was 295,502 dollars. By
1923, it was 12,931,819 dollars. And in 1929, 38,311,336 dollars.148 The Canadian
government benefited financially from both the importation and exportation of alcohol.
In 1918 the combined excise and customs duties on alcohol netted the Canadian
government 15,617,190; by 1928 it was 49,805,291.149 These numbers only account for
the alcohol tracked by customs via the twenty-dollar surcharge.150 Provincially, British
Columbia made 294,969 dollars in 1919, but 2,765,009 dollars in 1928. By 1928,
Quebec and Ontario were making over 7 and 8 million dollars, respectively.151 As for re
exports, in 1920 Canada re-exported 4,179 gallons of liquor, 18 gallons of malt beverage,

141 NCLOE, Enforcem ent vol. 1, 373.
143 NCLOE, Enforcem ent vol. 1,
145 NCLOE, Enforcem ent vol. 5,
145 NCLOE, E nforcem ent vol. 5,
147 NCLOE, E nforcem ent vol. 5,
148 NCLOE, E nforcem ent vol. 1,
149 NCLOE, E nforcem ent vol. 1,
150 Kobler, A rdent Spirits, 254.
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and 641 gallons of wine. In 1928, it re-exported 247,506 gallons of liquor, 634 gallons of
malt beverages, and 150,056 gallons of wine.

i co

Canadian Customs officials did share information with their American
counterparts about these shipments, and the transfer of information increased as
politicians negotiated heightened assistance.153 Still, many bootleggers would avoid the
surcharge by forging shipping documents. And often the information arrived in the
United States too late to arrest the importers.154 Roy Haynes, Prohibition Commissioner,
complained that their cargo was often “consigned to Mexican ports which it never
reaches, surreptitiously landed on the coast of Washington, Oregon, and California.”155
These shipments were not disclosed to officials in the United States, as they were, at least
on paper, not destined for American customers. This amounted to a significant amount of
the traffic from Canada. David Kyvig estimated that one million gallons of Canadian
liquor came into America each year from 1920-1930 - 80 percent of Canada’s
production.156
Not only were Prohibition agents expected to coordinate with the federal agencies
and foreign nations, in order to be effective they had to coordinate with state apparatuses.

152 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 1, 414.
153 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 1, 2 2 9 -2 8 5 ("C orrespondence b e tw e e n th e G overn m en ts o f Canada and th e
U nited S tates relative to com m ercial sm uggling across th e border").
154 In 1925 Canada and M exico sign ed a g re em en ts th a t required th e m to inform American C ustom s a g en ts
o f any sh ipm ents bound for th e U nited S tates. Kobler, A rd ent Spirits, 254.
155 Roy A. Haynes, Prohibition Inside O ut (Garden City, NY: D oubleday, 19 2 3 ) 149. He describ ed th e
procedure: "It m ay b e ord ered at a brew ery or distillery and co n sig n ed 'for export' to a certain [fictitious]
man in th e United S tates. A big b ootlegger... g o e s in person to th e b rew ery or distillery, places th e order,
n am es th e co n sig n ees, and ev e n th e p ow er boats on which th e liquor is to b e sh ipp ed ...P aym en t may be
m ade either th e re or on delivery at th e w harves, but usually is m a d e at th e tim e th e order is placed. All
th e form alities o f export are a tte n d e d to , including th e issuan ce o f in surance papers... C learance papers
are m ade ou t in d u e form , and ap proved by Canadian cu stom s officials. C learance fe e s are paid by each
small liquor boat in a ccord an ce w ith Canadian law s, and th e rev en u e, from t h e s e fe e s and from taxation
on liquor sales, is considerable." H aynes, Prohibition Inside Out, 9 0 -9 1 .
156 Kyvig, Repealing N a tio n a l Prohibition, 21.
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By 1929 there was no state legislation enforcing Prohibition in New York, Nevada,
Montana, Wisconsin, and Maryland. Maryland had never enacted any state enforcement
statute. Illinois residents twice voted in referendums to repeal its state laws, but the
•

Illinois Senate prevented repeal.

i

cn

t

Governor Albert C. Ritchie, o f Maryland, expressed

the frustrations of these state governments: “The eighteenth amendment gives the
Federal Government and the several States concurrent power to enforce it by appropriate
legislation. Some contend very earnestly that this imposes a concurrent obligation to
enforce, —that the power implies the duty.” He went on to explain Maryland’s position on
the matter: “Federal officials are bound to enforce Federal laws and State officials are
bound to enforce State laws, but neither Nation nor State is bound to enforce the laws of
the other... We are under no duty to help and relieve the Federal government of the
burdens and cost it has assumed under the Volstead law by making that law a Maryland
measure and setting up our own State machinery to enforce it, and thus making the
•

people of Maryland share its burdens and its costs; and we decline to do it.”

1S8

The

refusal to enact state laws or to use state officers to enforce federal laws was a matter of
federalism. But it was also a matter of economics. Prior to Prohibition, revenue from
liquor taxes had, for most city and state governments, amounted to a significant portion
of their operating budget.160 State and city governments resented using their funds to
enforce Prohibition and prosecute violators, when they had lost such a significant portion

157 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 5, 16 3 -1 6 4 . Both Illinois referendum p a ssed w ith over 6 0 p ercen t in favor o f
rem oving sta te prohibition laws.
158 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 5, 264. For a sim ilar rationale for th e repeal in N ew York o f th e M ullen-G age
law in 1923, s e e Kyvig, Repealing N a tio n a l Prohibition, 55-58.
160 Leslie Gordon, in 1930, w ro te o f th e ec o n o m ic s o f repeal. "If th e liquor n o w sold by b o o tleg g ers w as
legally sold, regulated, and taxed , th e excise in co m e w ould pay th e in terest on th e en tire local and
national b on d ed in d e b ted n e ss and lea v e m ore than $ 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 for o th er urgently n e e d e d purposes." The
N ew Crusade (Cleveland, 1932) xxi-xxii, cited in E ngelw ood, "Organized Thirst," in Alcohol, Reform and
Society, Jack S. Blocker, Jr., ed ., 183.
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of their operating expenses when Volstead was passed. Prohibition restricted federal
revenue as well. From 1873 to 1917, the revenue on spirits was 23 percent of the
nation’s tax receipts.161 As an indication, the first six months of 1933 brought the federal
*•
•
1fcf)
government 54.1 million dollars in revenue from beer alone.
On the state level, New
York lost 22.6 million dollars it collected under liquor taxes, more than a quarter of the
state budget.163 Locally, as an example, Atlanta’s liquor tax generated 48.6 percent of its
revenue before it instituted Prohibition.164 Washington State, when it began collecting
revenue after Prohibition, amassed 8.6 million dollars in revenue. The same year, 1936,
total revenue from state taxes was 50 million dollars.165 Many localities refused to allow
Prohibition to drain their already limited resources; only eighteen states allocated any
money at all to enforcement state or national Prohibition laws. “By 1927 their [these
state governments’] financial contribution to the cause was about one-eighth of the sum
they spent enforcing their own fish and game laws.” 166
Even in those states that had local legislation obligating state and local officers to
enforce prohibition, cooperation was often not forthcoming or logistically possible. For
the same economic reasons that some states opted out of Prohibition, local enforcement
agencies often could not afford time-consuming and expensive investigations of liquor
trafficking. Local officers were a part of the community in which they worked, and
would often, according to Nelson Johnson, “obstruct federal officials attempting to secure
161 Richard F. Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth A m endm ent: Tem perance Reform, Legal Culture, and the
Polity, 1 8 8 0 -1 9 2 0 (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f North Carolina Press, 1995) 46, citing Tun-Yuan Hu, The Liquor
Tax in the U nited States, 1791-1 9 4 7 , Columbia U niversity M on ograp h s in Public Finance and National
Incom e, no. I (N ew York: G raduate School o f Business, Columbia U niversity, 1951) en d p ie ce .
162 Ogle, Am bitious Brew, 202.
163 Lerner, Dry M a n h a tta n , 51.
154 Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth A m endm ent, 97, citing Jam es M. W right, The License System o f the City
o f A tla n ta (n.p.: Harper Printer Co., 1964) 23 7 .

155 Clark, The Dry Years, 244.
166 Rose, Am erican W om en a n d the Repeal o f Prohibition, 47. Allen, Only Yesterday, 218.
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compliance with Prohibition.”167 They had no interest in arresting their family and
friends for minor violations of the prohibition laws. Sometimes these local officers were
violating Volstead themselves. Corruption was also common with state and local
officials. Joseph Blasey, International Secretary Treasurer of the Journeyman
Stonecutters’ Association of North America, summed up what he considered the
“workingman’s view” of the situation. “Most of these [places where liquors can be
purchased] are running without interference by the police, which would lead one to
believe that they are getting protection in some way. If the civilian population knows of
these conditions and where these speak-easies are, surely it can not be said that the police
•

and other authorities do not know of them and where they are located.”

1

The public

witnessed blatant violations o f the Volstead Act, and both the federal agents and local
enforcement officials did not investigate and prosecute offenders. To many it seemed
that Volstead’s failure did not stem from an inability to enforce the law.
Those officials, local, state, or federal, who did try to enforce the law faced the
burgeoning business of crime. The Volstead Act created an opportunity for criminals
already active in gambling, prostitution, and racketeering to become quickly and
immensely wealthy. Prohibition Commissioner Roy Haynes entitled the eighth chapter
of Prohibition Inside Out “Enforcement and the Big Violator.” He describes the illicit
liquor organizations as “aping” legitimate business.170 Lynn Dumenil, in Modern
Temper: American Culture and Society in the 1920s, likened the bootleggers’ operations
to the “output system” of “early industrial manufacturers” - they “organized networks of

167 N elson Johnson, B oardw alk Empire: The Birth, High Times, and Corruption o f A tlan tic City (M edford, NJ:
M edford Press, 2 0 0 2 ) 87.
168 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 3, 28 8 -2 8 9 .
170 Haynes, Prohibition Inside Out, 102.
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home stills as part of their production and distribution system.”

171

Whether their method

was to get liquor off the floating warehouses of Rum Row on the east coast, over the
Canadian border at Detroit or other points of entry, across the waterways separating
Canada and the United States, or across the border with Mexico, criminals used existing
drug networks and created new networks to transport liquor into and around the country.
Criminal enterprises also produced and distributed domestic liquors and beers. Doing so
required physical space and equipment, trucks for transport, and many employees. Many
of these organizations kept careful records, even hiring accountants and lawyers. Often it
was these records that led to successful prosecution.
Today a lawful business will take into account the risks and costs inherent in its
operation, mostly by taking out insurance policies to help defray the costs of litigation.
The criminal enterprises of the Prohibition era operated will full knowledge that their
products might be seized by the government. This was factored into their purchasing,
pricing, and planning. The Wickersham Commission noted that these syndications are
“not deterred by the occasional seizure of a carload of liquor or confiscation of a boat or
truck. The business has been established on the basis of a definite risk of seizure.” 172
Even the prospect of being fined or sent to prison was a calculated risk. Haynes wrote
that “fines are considered merely an element of business expense. Imprisonment,
although inconvenient, is not regarded by some as sufficient to warrant passing up a
•

fortune which will await them when the prison sentence is over.”

1H'X

This ability to

absorb loss and still be profitable and operational is part of what made these criminal
enterprises difficult to shut down for even the most honest, well-trained enforcement
171 Dum enil, M o d ern Temper, 233.
172 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 2, 151.
1 73
Haynes, Prohibition Inside Out, 103.
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agent. And this organization and seeming impenetrability is what inspired federal agents
to use techniques like wiretapping.
The inadequacy of the federal machinery that existed to enforce Prohibition and
the corruption endemic to the Prohibition Bureau created near chaos. Lack of training,
lack of funding, lack of cooperation from other federal agencies, states, and countries these factors led Prohibition agents, whether in good faith or not, to try new techniques
and often act overzealously to investigate .and arrest these seemingly well-organized
violators of the Volstead Act.
These investigative and enforcement methods were then tested by the Supreme
Court, which issued a series of opinions that transformed the interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment. Governor Albert C. Ritchie of Maryland essentially catalogued the
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions during Prohibition:
Our houses are no longer our castles... we can be halted and searched as
we go about our lawful adventures, and can be hectored, browbeaten and even
cold-bloodedly shot down, - all in the name of the law ... If all this is not the
nullification of supposedly inalienable rights and liberties, what is?210

He saw each of these decisions as an infringement on liberty, as did the public. Each
decision brought the judiciary closer to acknowledging that there was a line at which the
government should not intrude into a citizen’s personal life or personal space - that the
Constitution grants a right to privacy. During Prohibition the Court never actually
acknowledged this right. It consistently found that the government had not violated the
Fourth Amendment. 211 The cases decided under the Fourth Amendment increasingly
circumscribed individual citizens’ rights and gave federal agents more leeway. Supreme
210 NCLOE, Enforcement, vol. 5, 270.
211 An actual right to privacy w as n ot ack n ow led ged by th e Court until 1 9 65, w ith its decision in Griswaid
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 4 7 9 (1965).
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Court Justices began, in Olmstead, to question what the Fourth Amendment was meant to
protect. In his dissent, Brandeis articulates for the first time, with three of his brethren
concurring, that the Fourth Amendment implicates more than the protection of physical
places, tangible objects, and the corpus of a person. He posited that the Fourth
Amendment should guarantee the individual the right to be let alone.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.”212 Prior to Prohibition, jurisprudence related to
this Amendment was limited to a few cases. Boyd v. United States, decided in 1886, was
the leading case that extended Fourth Amendment protection to a government action that
did not constitute physically entering a property. The government mandated by statute
that a suspect provide certain paperwork to the government. This paperwork, if produced
by the suspect, would incriminate that suspect. The Supreme Court held that this demand
was a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because the
production of the paperwork forced the suspect to incriminate himself, in violation of the
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. In future cases, the government would have
to produce a warrant to search for that paperwork. Just because the government did not
physically enter the office where the paperwork was located, did not mean that no search
occurred. In 1914, in Weeks v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the admittance
into evidence of papers and records seized from a defendant’s house when there was no
arrest warrant for that defendant or search warrant for the premises and no permission
212 U.S. Const. A m end. IV.
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given to the officers to enter was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. This is known as
the “exclusionary rule:” the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use in trial of evidence that
was obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure. In 1920, Silverthorne Lumber
Company v. United States extended the Fourth Amendment protections to corporations
and their offices, papers, and effects. From these cases the Court crafted its opinions in
Olmstead and the other cases decided during Prohibition. During Prohibition, the Court
in effect created an entire field in Constitutional doctrine.
Kenneth Murchison characterized the years from 1920-1929 as “A Doctrinal
Explosion” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, with the Court issuing twenty opinions
that addressed Fourth Amendment concerns during the first ten years o f Prohibition.
Murchison found that throughout Prohibition the Court increasingly “divided over
controversial enforcement practices but [was] still willing to tolerate the intrusive
practices necessary to catch serious violators.”213 Kyvig found that, during the 1920s, the
“Court’s opinions substantially strengthened the machinery for enforcing law and order...
[creating] the image of a government prepared to engage in more aggressive and intrusive
policing practices than ever before.” This was done specifically to enforce the
Prohibition law.214
The first Prohibition-era case that addressed Fourth Amendment issues was
Gouled v. United States (1921), in which the Justices opined that the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments are to be liberally construed by the courts.

An intelligence officer

entered Gouled’s house pretending it was a social call. He then took papers from the
house without Gouled’s knowledge or permission. In its decision, the Court prohibited
213 M urchison, Forgotten Influence, 73.
214 Kyvig, Repealing, 35.
215 Gouled v. U nited States 255 U.S. 298, 30 3 (1921).
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federal officers from entering and searching a premises by “stealth, through social
acquaintance, or the guise of a business call” if they did not have a warrant.
excluded from trial any evidence obtained in this manner.

217

216

It also

•
While Gouled was not a

Prohibition case, it was a prelude to the cases decided under the Fourth Amendment in
the context of investigating and enforcing Prohibition laws. The Court set a precedent
that, at least in theory, it would interpret the Fourth Amendment liberally “to prevent
stealthy encroachment upon or ‘gradual depreciation’ of the rights secured by them [the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments], by imperceptible practice of the courts or by well
intentioned, but mistakenly overzealous, executive officers.”

The Court acknowledged

that there was unlimited potential for the Fourth Amendment to limit citizens’ rights.
Throughout the 1920s, the Court repeatedly interpreted the Amendment in favor of law
enforcement and not the people, specifying various exceptions to the warrant requirement
and limiting the physical and metaphorical reach o f the Amendment’s protection.
The next case in which the Court tackled the Fourth Amendment was Hester v.
United States. In 1924 the Court defined the “open fields” surrounding a house as exempt
from the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The Bureau agents positioned
themselves on land about one hundred yards from the Hester house. From this vantage
point, they observed a man drive toward the house. They then saw-Hester come outside
and give the man a bottle. The agents sounded the alarm, and the man threw aside the
bottle. The agents arrested Hester. The Court was unanimous in its opinion that the
possibility that the agents had trespassed on Hester’s land did not implicate the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The agents’ actions did not amount to a search,
215 Gouled v. U.S. 255 U.S. 298, at 305.
217 Gouled v. U.S. 255 U.S. 298, at 306.
218 Gouled v. U.S. 255 U.S. 298 at 304.
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and the confiscation of the containers was not a seizure, as they were discarded. Here the
Court limited the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the actual building, and not to
<■} 1 Q

the entire property owned by the defendant.
In 1925’s Carroll v. United States, the Court outlined an automobile exception to
the warrant requirement which has survived to the present day.

990

Agents stopped and

searched a vehicle driven by persons they suspected were illegally transporting alcohol
from Detroit. After tearing back a seat cushion, agents found sixty-eight cases of liquor.
The whiskey was seized and the suspects arrested. Chief Justice Taft noted the
impracticality of securing a warrant before the vehicle moved. The Court granted an
exception to the warrant requirement in cases where officers “have reasonable or
probable cause for believing that the automobile has contraband.” While Carroll does
create an exception to the warrant requirement, giving enforcement officers the ability to
search and seize under new circumstances, it also creates an expectation of privacy in
one’s automobile. Before officers make a warrantless search or seizure of an automobile,
they must have “reasonable or probably cause” that contraband goods are inside. The
search cannot be made unless the officer can justify his reasons for searching that
automobile at that time.
Part of the argument rejected by the Court in Carroll was that the search of the
vehicle fell under the “search-incident-to-arresf ’ exception to the warrant requirement
that had already been drawn by the Court. This exception (still a part of Fourth
219 H ester v. U nited States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). The "curtilage," or area im m ed ia tely surrounding a
structure like a h o u se, is p ro tected by th e Fourth A m end m en t. In th e m ajority opinion in th e Olm stead
case, th e Court referen ced this p rotection , but th e Court did n ot legally d efin e curtilage until 19 8 7 in
U nited States v. Dunn, 4 8 0 U.S. 294 (1987).
220 The excep tion also ap plies to "a search o f a ship, m otor b oat, or w a g o n for con trab and g o o d s w h e re it

is n ot practicable to se cu re a w arrant b eca u se th e veh icle can be quickly m oved." Carroll v. U nited States
267 U.S. 132, 150 (1925).
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Amendment law) allows an officer to arrest a suspect and search the suspect and the. area
within his immediate control, if the officer has witnessed the suspect committing a crime.
Since the officers did not stop the vehicle because they had witnessed a known violation
of the law, but stopped it because of a reasonable suspicion, the search was not incident
to the arrest; the arrest took place after the search. The Court, in a 1925 narcotics case,
did not extend the search-incident-to arrest-exception to the premises of a defendant if the
defendant was not arrested in that premises. Agnello was arrested several blocks for
from his home. After the arrest, officers searched his home and seized evidence. In this
situation, the Fourth Amendment protections require the officers to get a search warrant
for the residence. 221
In Marron v. United States, another Prohibition case decided in 1927, the Court
refined the search-incident-to-arrest exception further. A warrant was issued to search a
property leased by Marron, specifying that the officers were looking for “intoxicating
liquors and articles for their manufacture.” When agents searched the premises, several
persons were “being furnished intoxicating liquors.” The person supplying the liquor
was arrested. The agents conducted their search, seizing items specified in the warrant.
They also seized a business ledger that they had discovered in a closet. The Court was
very clear that the search warrant alone did not give the agents authorization to seize the
ledger, as it was not specified in that warrant. However, the arrest for a crime committed
in the presence of the agents allowed a search of the premises “to find and seize the
things used to carry on a criminal enterprise.” Agents were entitled to search “all parts
of the premises used for the illegal purpose,” so long as the area was in the “immediate
possession and control” of the person arrested. Again, the Court circumscribed some
221 Agnello v. U nited States, 2 6 9 U.S. 20 (1925).
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rights while affirming others. A person’s home could be thoroughly searched, if the
homeowner was arrested on the premises while committing an illegal act (and the
arresting officer has legally entered the premises to witness that act). However, the Court
specifically limited the seizure of items pursuant to a valid search warrant to those items
particularly described in the warrant.222
Prior to the Olmstead case, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence defining searches
was limited. While the Court did acknowledge that “searching” did not necessarily entail
physically entering a premises, it was clear that in order to enter a residence or premises a
federal officer needed a search warrant. The officer could enter the “open fields”
surrounding the premises without a warrant, but could not actually enter the premises
itself. The search warrant itself had to be specific in identifying the place to be searched
and the items to be seized. There were only two permissible ways to avoid this
requirement: The search-incident-to arrest exception (and even then the officers could
not search the home of the suspect unless the arrest took place in the home); and the
“automobile exception,” where automobiles, boats, and other vehicles able to move could
be searched without a warrant if the officer reasonably suspected that the vehicle
contained contraband.
Olmstead v. United States was decided in 1928; Murchison describes it as the
Court’s “most famous prohibition decision.”223 The issue decided by the Justices in the
case was whether or not the warrantless wire tapping of a defendant’s telephone line
constituted an impermissible search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment - that is,
whether wiretapping was either a “search” or a “seizure.” This was the last case in which

222 M arro n v. U nited States , 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
223 M urchison, Forgotten Influence, 65-68, q u o te on 65.
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the Court would test the contours of the Fourth Amendment during Prohibition. And
again, as warned of in the Gouled decision issued at the beginning of the decade, the
Court circumscribed the rights protected by the Amendment and gave law enforcement.
It was here that Justice Brandeis wrote in his dissent of “the right to be let alone.”224
Understanding how Roy Olmstead operated, how he was caught, and the case as
presented to the court are necessary to understand the dilemmas faced by the Court when
they heard the appeal in 1928.
Roy Olmstead started out his adult life with a career in the Seattle police force. In
1916 he was youngest member of the Seattle police force to achieve the rank of
lieutenant.

00 ^

He was married and had two children. The mayor was a close friend, as

was William Boeing. However, in 1920, at age 34, he was arrested under the Volstead
Act for the sale of liquor. The arrest and guilty plea cost him a five hundred dollar fine
and his law enforcement career.

0 0 f\
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•

Undone as a cop, Olmstead dedicated himself his

criminal enterprise. Realizing that the liquor underworld in Seattle was loosely organized
and poorly managed and knowing that he could count on the friends he had made in the
police department to look the other way, Olmstead set about organizing his own
rumrunning operation.

00 7

With ten men each investing one thousand dollars and

Olmstead matching that ten thousand, he had the capital to start his enterprise.
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224 Brandeis had already w ritten ab ou t privacy law in and 1890 law review article th a t he co -au th ored with
S. D. Warren. It w as here th at h e in serted th e co n c e p t into federal jurisp ru dence. "The Right to Privacy,"
4 Harvard Law R eview 193 (1890). This phrase w a s picked up by Morris L. Ernst and Alan U. Schwartz in
Privacy: The Right to Be Left Alone, (N ew York: M acm illan, 1962). The law review article w as fo cu sed on
th e "right to be let alone" from th e intrusions o f th e press and publication o f p h otograp h s w ith ou t
co n sen t, a tort. Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life (Pantheon: N ew York, 2 0 0 9 ) 10 0 -1 0 2 .
225 Clark, The Dry Years, 162.
226 Clark, The Dry Years, 163. O lm stead w as arrested on March 2 2 ,1 9 2 0 unloading a tu g b o a t. It is unclear
if it w as his op eration , or if h e w as sim ply helping.
227 Clark, The Dry Years, 162 (referring to th e co m p etitio n b e tw e e n rival gan gs - Jack M arquett and th e
Billingsley brothers (Logan and Fred). S ee p revious ch ap ters o f Clark. V an d em eer, later O lm stead 's
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Olmstead partnered with Consolidated Liquor Exporters, liquor wholesalers in
Canada, and schemed to avoid the twenty-dollar Canadian tax by drawing up the bills of
lading as if the liquor was being transported to Ensanada, Mexico. 229 After being loaded,
•

some of these boats went to small islands in Puget Sound, D ’Arcy Island or Discovery
Island or Portland Island, others headed out to sea.

Jack Rhodes, the captain of the

‘Eva B’ (one of Olmstead’s boats), testified “that [he] left Seattle for the purpose of
going to Turn Point, Stuart Island, Washington, United States for a load of liquor; that the
‘Eva B ’ received this liquor from another vessel somewhere near the International
Boundary Line in the vicinity of Turn Point; that after they received the load of liquor the
‘Eva B ’ went to Portland Island, British Columbia, in Canada, there to await nightfall and
an opportunity of bringing her load safely into American waters.”231 Smaller craft picked
up shipments, ran them across the Puget Sound, and arrived in Seattle, sometimes on

attorney, re p resen ted th e Billingsleys in 1916, w h en W ashington S ta te e n a cte d its dry law, - actually
settin g up a com p an y th at im ported liquor from Cuba (at least on paper - th e actual liquor w as arriving
from San Francisco). Clark, The Dry Years, 1 3 1 -1 3 2 . N o te th at V and erm eer w a s previously th e p rosecu tor
o f King County.
228 Clark, The Dry Years, 163. It is unclear from th e court d o cu m en ts if th e re w e r e ten or elev en investors,
but "Roy w as to g e t half and th e o th er half w as to b e split equally." Erickson et. al. v. U.S. "Assignm ent of
Errors" 6. John McLean testified in th e Olm stead trial th a t th e re w er e 11 m en w ith O lm stead
contributing 1 1 ,0 0 0 dollars. U nited States v. Olm stead "Bill o f Exceptions" 8, R ecords o f th e District
Courts o f th e U nited S tates. Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational A rchives and Records
A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.

229 Clark, The Dry Years, 164. U nited States v. W ilber E. Dow, et. at. "Proposed A m en d m en ts to th e
D efen dan ts P rop osed Bill o f Exceptions" 16a, 17, 18-19, 3 7 and U.S. v. O lm stead "Bill o f Exceptions o f Roy
O lm stead, et. al." 236, both in Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational A rchives and Records
A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
230 Clark, The Dry Years, 164, 165. The Canadian g o v ern m en t kept D'Arcy Island as a leprosy station,
insulating it from "curiosity."
231 Erickson v. U nited States "A m ended A ssign m ent o f Errors" May 1 9 2 6 . 2-3, Record Group 21. Boxes
3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational Archives and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska R egion. S eattle.
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secluded beaches, but often at public docks.

The liquor was then offloaded onto

trucks, one bearing a sign for “Occidental Bread,” one “Sausage, meats and Poultry,” and
another a pastry symbol.

Then the liquor was taken to a farm on the outskirts of town

that Olmstead purchased to use as a warehouse.

994

In Seattle, there was a central office

with “telephones, typewriters, and office equipment. And one could at any time of the
i
day order and pay for whiskey.”235 Runners would pick up the liquor from the ranch,
bring it to one of the depots in town - the Lenora Garage, for example. From there
runner would deliver orders for customers that included private citizens, hotels, clubs,
golf courses, businesses, and speakeasies.
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Olmstead employed nearly one hundred

people, including a lawyer (Jerry Finch) and at least two bookkeepers (Dick Bennett and
Bernard Ward).

997

Olmstead provided the residents of Seattle with a varied supply of

alcohol: Corby’s Rye Whiskey, White Horse Whiskey, Gilmore’s Royal, Old Parr,
Catto’s Rose Label, John Haig Whiskey, Bullock & Lade, Johnny Walker Black and Red
Label, King George VI Cream Label, Sandy McDonald and Thompson’s Whiskey,
Gordon Gin, Gilby’s Dry Gin, Dewar’s Extra Special, Old Crow Rye Whiskey, Johnson’s

232 Clark, The Dry Years, 165. They o ften used W o o d m o n t Beach. Liquor w as u n load ed at Superior Fish
Dock, Jahn & C om pany Dock, S un de & O lsen's Shipyard, and th e Lander S treet Dock. U.S. v. W ilber E. Dow
"Proposed A m en d m en ts to th e D efen d an ts Proposed Bill o f Exceptions" 10, 14, 14a, 16.
233 Erickson v. U.S. "A m ended A ssign m ent o f Errors" 7 ,1 2 , Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , National
Archives and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S ea ttle. W hitney rem em b ers th e sign as
"Fresh M eats, S ausages, Flam." U.S. v. Olm stead "Bill o f Exceptions" 17, Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 ,
National Archives and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
234 The V iele Ranch. U.S. v. O lm stead "Bill of.Exceptions" 11-D, Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational
Archives and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
235 U.S. v. W ilber E. Dow, et. al. "Proposed A m en d m en ts to th e D efen d a n ts P rop osed Bill o f Exceptions" 5.
236 T h ese included th e P uget Mil! C om pany, th e S ea ttle Golf & Country Club, and th e Arctic Club. U.S. v.
Olm stead "Bill o f E xceptions o f Roy O lm stead , Jerry L. Finch, M yer Berg, Ed Engdahl, John Earle, Cliff
M aurice, Clarence G. Flealy, Tom N akagaw a, and F. R. Brown" 235, Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 ,
National Archives and R ecords A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska R egion. S ea ttle.
237 Clark, The Dry Years, 164: "scouts, transfer m en, o ffice m en, sa le sm en , te le p h o n e op erators,
d ispatchers, checkers, collectors, b ook k eep ers, and an attorney." - fed eral court: 19 F. 2 nd 8 4 9 (9th Cir.,
1927). U.S. v. O lm stead "Bill o f Exceptions" 9, Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational Archives and
Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
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Old Rye, King George Gold Label, Hennessy’s Three Star Brandy, Cliquot Champagne,
peach brandy, Usher’s Green Stripe Whiskey, Chartreuse, red Curacao, Granny Taylor
Whiskey, Mumm’s Extra Dry Champagne, Gordon’s Sloe Gin, and Benedictine.
Olmstead could import two thousand to four thousand cases per trip. Avoiding
the 20 dollar surcharge at this volume saved him thousands o f dollars, a savings he
passed on to his customers. While the rest of the country dealt with an astronomical rise
in liquor prices, Olmstead’s customers paid approximately only two dollars more per
bottle than Canadian citizens. Even at this low price, Olmstead had earnings of over
200,000 dollars per month. Because he was buying in bulk and making an immense
profit, Olmstead did not feel a need to dilute the alcohol with chemicals and flavorings,
thus making him unique among bootleggers.

9TQ

Prohibition Commission Haynes

revealed that, nationally, less than 1 percent of the 60,000 samples of bootleg whiskey
tested by the Prohibition Unit were pure whiskey. The rest “were contaminated - most of
them by dangerous or poisonous substances.”240 In the first six months of 1923, there
were 647 deaths from drinking poisonous liquor in Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, and
Philadelphia alone.

1

*

While the rest of the country was plagued by death and disease

from the effects o f diluted liquor, Olmstead’s customers in Seattle were not. Norman
Clark describes him as, “scrupulously guarding] the integrity o f his products, selling
without adulteration the liquor he brought from Canada.”

949

This helped Olmstead

succeed in Seattle.

238 Olm stead v. U.S. "Bill o f Exceptions" 55 -5 7 , Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational Archives and
Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
239 Clark, The Dry Years, 165.
240 H aynes, Prohibition Inside Out, 186.
241 H aynes, Prohibition Inside Out, 1 8 6-187 .
242 Clark, The Dry Years, 165.
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Olmstead still had friends on the police force who would keep him and his
employees from arrest and his liquor from seizure. These officers did not help simply out
of friendship; Olmstead paid a significant amount to the department in bribes, and indeed
without graft men like Olmstead could never have risen to power. Edwin T. Hunt,
headquarters clerk of the Seattle Police Department at the time, said that the going rates
for graft in Seattle were: fifty dollars per month per joint. This was due on the tenth of
the month and split between the Dry Squad, the Chief of Police, and the Mayor. Any
“joint” that did not pay was raided.243 This graft was estimated to amount to between
seventy-six and eighty thousand dollars per month for the Chief of Police and higher
ups.244 Lee Parker, deputy sheriff of King County from 1922 or 1923 through May
1926, helped Olmstead transfer loads of alcohol from the beaches to the ranch. He was
paid 250 dollars a month for this work.245 He was also tipped off by the police. Richard
Fryant, Prohibition agent and wiretapper, testified that “Christy of the Dry Squad had
called [Olmstead]... and told him that they were going to raid it.”

He paid off Coast

Guard men to let his boats pass without incident.247 He also had friends on the Canadian
police force that helped smooth his export papers, and he bribed Customs officials in
Canada and in the United States.
The individuals involved in Olmstead’s arrest were typical of the Prohibition
period. Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for the Pacific Northwest, William M.

243 Gerald v. Close, "M em o," June 19, 1931. Record Group 56. Box 1.
244 "GRAFT," May 8, 1931. Record Group 56. Box 1.
245 U. S. v. W ilber E. Dow, "Proposed A m en d m en ts to th e D efen d an ts P roposed Bill o f Exceptions," 33,
Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational A rchives and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region.
S eattle.
246 Olm stead v. U.S. "G overnm ent's P roposed A m en d m en t to th e Bill o f Exceptions" 71, Record Group 21.
Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational Archives and R ecords A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S ea ttle.
247 U.S. v. W ilber E. D ow "Bill o f Exceptions" 11-12, Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational Archives
and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
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Whitney, headed the investigation under the watchful eye of Administrator Roy C. Lyle.
Prior to joining the Bureau, Whitney had no experience in law enforcement; Roy Lyle
failed his civil service examination in 1927.248 Whitney was accused by Olmstead and
other defendants of threatening the foreman of the grand jury, a client of Olmstead, with
adding his name to the “bottom of the list” of defendants in the Olmstead case if he did
not return the indictment without any changes.249 And, shortly after the Olmstead case
had been decided by the Supreme Court, Whitney and Lyle were indicted for “conspiracy
to take a bribe” and conspiracy to violate the Volstead Act.
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Roy Olmstead left McNeil

Penitentiary and testified at their trial for the prosecution. They were found not guilty,
but the evidence was far from conclusive.251 By 1931, Lyle had become Supervisor of
Permits for the Bureau of Industrial Alcohol and was under investigation for granting the
Heinrich Brewing Company o f Seattle a permit to manufacture wort, knowing that the
Brewery intended to manufacture beer. Whitney was the legal counsel for the Heinrich
Brewing Company, advising them and offering to represent anyone arrested. He was also
under investigation 252
The Bureau located an inside man to help take down Olmstead in Al Hubbard.
Facing the threat o f prosecution, Hubbard offered to turn traitor, and Lyle made him an
agent of the Prohibition Bureau. Hubbard was close to his prey: prior to joining the
Bureau as an undercover agent, Hubbard had been living with Olmstead and his wife. He
248 Clark, The Dry Years, 178.
249 U.S. v. O lm stead "Plea in A batem ent" 4-5. Roy O lm stead. April 4, 1 9 2 5 , Record Group 21. Boxes 369372, N ational A rchives and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
250 N ew York Times, "Seattle Dry Chief and A ides Indicted," May 2 7 ,1 9 3 0 . Corwin and Fryant w er e also
included in th e in dictm ent. O lm stead accu sed W hitney o f b ein g th e m a ster mind o f th e o p eration for
which he had b een im prison ed .
251 Clark, The Dry Years, 2 1 1 -2 1 5 .
252 R. A. Bem an, "Letter to L. Dean Hickman," July 14, 1932, "Letter to Bureau o f Prohibition, D.C.,"
January 10, 1932, and "M em o," July 6, 1932. Record Group 56. Folder 45-A. Conspiracy to transport
alcohol b e tw e e n California and O regon.
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designed and built the receiver for Olmstead’s radio station that broadcast from his
residence (KFOX - the first in Seattle).253 Like others, this agent had no experience in
law enforcement. He was accused of buying and selling alcohol while a Prohibition
agent; he was accused of selling 8,000 cases of liquor at 1 dollar a case for his own
profit.254 Years after the Olmstead trial, Hubbard was still working for the Bureau,
though in 1931 Charles A. Murphy, Agent in Charge, wrote that he “did not want
anything to do with any case in which Mr. Hubbard would be revealed; that he was
dynamite... [if] the informant should be Mr. Hubbard... we would undoubtedly lose the
case.” By 1931, Hubbard had joined the system of corruption, “shaking down what
liquor he could.” 255
The last member of this team of agents was Richard Fry ant. Previously the
Deputy Sheriff of King Country and a telephone lineman for ten years, Fryant had
become a private investigator.

Fryant wiretapped Olmstead’s office line at first to

blackmail him. When Olmstead refused to pay the ten thousand dollars Fryant
demanded, Fryant turned to Whitney and offered the wiretaps and the information
available to him instead.

Like Hubbard, Whitney made Fryant a Bureau agent.

He

set to tapping the phones at Olmstead’s office, his co-conspirators’ homes (Dick Elbro,
Herbert Fletcher, Sid Green, and Mr. Parkhurst) and his lawyer’s office (Jerry Finch).

253 O lm stead fou n d ed th e A m erican Radio Telegraph Com pany, S ea ttle 's first radio station - KFOX. Clark,
The Dry Years, 165. Clark, The Dry Years, 171 (Hubbard's ap p o in tm en t).
254 U.S. \j. W ilber E. Dow, "Proposed A m en d m en ts to th e D efen d an ts P rop osed Bill o f Exceptions" 1; "Bill
o f Exceptions" 1-2, both in Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational A rchives and Records
A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
255 Charles A. Murphy, "Letter," Record Group 56. Box 1. S ea ttle Conspiracy.
256 Olm stead v. U.S. "Bill o f Exceptions" 121, Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational Archives and
Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
257 Olm stead v. U.S. "Bill o f Exceptions" 149, Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational Archives and
Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
258 Clark, The Dry Years, 168.
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Fryant tapped the three phones in the office at 1025 Henry Building in June 1924, Dick
Elbro’s home phone in July (11) 1924, Olmstead’s home phone at the end of July (30)
1924, Finch’s office at the beginning of August 1924, Herbert Fletcher’s home phone in
August (8) 1924, Sid Green’s home phone and Mr. Parkhurst’s home phone in
September (9) 1924, 259 By 1931, this wiretapper/agent became known as “the first
person contacted by bootleggers who desire to open protected ‘joints’ in King
County.”260
These were the men pursuing Olmstead. There was no evidence for their
corruption at the time of the trial, but it is significant that the men who brought down one
of the biggest rumrunners in the country later seemed dirtier than Olmstead himself.
Federal agents began listening to the conversations over the wiretap in June of
1924.261 They had placed taps on Olmstead’s home, Finch’s office, the switchboard
office of the operation, and several homes of members of the organization. Technology
to tape the conversations did not exist at the time, so the federal agents would take turns
listening in on Olmstead’s conversations and taking notes.
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Olmstead was aware that

the lines were being tapped - his home, his office, his lawyer’s office, and homes of his
employees. Bill Smith called Charles S. Green’s home (both defendants) and told the
259 Olm stead v. US. "Bill o f Exceptions" 121, 134, 138, 142, 143, Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 ,
National Archives and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S ea ttle.
260 Gerald V. Close, "M em o," June 18, 1931. Record Group 56. Box 1. S ea ttle Conspiracy.
261 Erickson v. U.S. "A m ended A ssign m en t o f Errors" 27, Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational
Archives and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
262 W hitney's w ife took th e transcriptions and cop ied th em into longhand and th en typ ed th em into w hat
w ould b e know n in th e trial as th e Black Book. The original n o te s w er e n o t kept by th e agen ts; th ey relied
in court on th e Black Book to refresh their reco llectio n s o f sp ecific co n v ersa tio n s. During th e trial,
O lm stead's attorn ey, G eorge V and erm eer, o b jected rep ea ted ly to th e u se o f th e Black Book b eca u se
th ere w as no w ay to be certain th at its c o n te n ts w er e verbatim th e co n v ersa tio n s th at to o k place b eca u se
o f th e rep eated copying o f th e transcriptions and disposal o f th e original n o te s. He also o b jected b eca u se
he w as not allow ed to view th e Black Book, as its co n ten ts w er e n ever a d m itted into ev id en ce. W hile th e
ap p ellate courts refused his appeal on th e s e tw o issu es, it is certainly d eb a ta b le w h e th e r or not sustaining
th e s e o b jection s w a s reversib le error by th e trial judge.
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woman who answered “Roy had given instructions that all their lines had been tapped
and to have no further conversations over any of the lines that would be of any
importance... be careful what you say as this line is tapped by the Federals.”264 On the
basis of the information gleaned from the wiretapped phone calls, Whitney got a federal
warrant to search Olmstead’s house for alcohol. 265 The conversations overheard via the
wiretaps suggested that Olmstead was carrying on his alcohol distribution business from
his home.

Search warrants were also served on Finch’s office, the business office of

the organization, and the homes of other defendants.

9^ 7

On September 17, 1924, Whitney

arrived with his wife and other agents while Olmstead and his wife were hosting a dinner
party.268 A thorough search turned up no alcohol, but the agents stayed in the Olmstead
home. Whitney and his wife took turns calling Olmstead’s known friends and associates,
pretending to be the Olmsteads. They told each person on the other end of the line that
they were having a party and to come by with some liquor. As people arrived, they were
arrested. At 2:30 in the morning, all of those arrested were taken to the Prohibition office
for questioning.

9 AQ

Several of the people present at the party or who arrived after the

264 Erickson v. U.S. "A m ended A ssign m ent o f Errors" 57, Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , National
A rchives and R ecords A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
2650 lm ste a d , via Jerry Finch, su ed th e g overn m en t for d a m a g es resulting from this probable illegal search.
Olm stead v. D. H. Blair, e t al. "Complaint" 1-8. D ecem b er 20, 1924. Finch v. Revelle et. al. "Brief" 1-4. All
in Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational Archives and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska
Region. S eattle.
266 U.S. v. Olm stead "Affdavit o f Earl Corwin in O pposition to Petition to Suppress" 2, Record Group 21.
Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational Archives and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
267 U.S. v. O lm stead "Petition to Quash Search W arrant, Return Property and Suppress Evidence" 'Exhibit
C / (Search w arrant for 3 7 5 7 R idgeway Place - th e O lm stead resid en ce), 'Exhibit F' (Search w arrant for
Room 1026 L. C. Sm ith Building - offices). All in Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational Archives and
R ecords A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
268 Erickson v. U.S. "A m ended A ssign m ent o f Errors" 4 9 , Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational
Archives and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
269 A nother point o f p otentially reversible error is th a t Section 25 o f th e V olstead Act a llow ed a search
w arrant for a private h o m e only on p rob able ca u se th a t th ere w a s a sa le o f alcoholic b ev era g es within
th at resid en ce. As no sale w as taking place, and th e search turned up no alcohol, th e a g en ts should have
left th e prem ises. U.S. v. O lm stead "Bill o f Exceptions" 9 0 -91. April 19, 1926. U.S. v. Olm stead Bill of
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Whitneys’ calls were listed on the arrest warrant. Those who were not were arrested
because their presence at the house, which was putatively being used for the illegal
distribution of alcohol, made them potential coconspirators. In all, there were ninety-one
people listed as defendants in the Olmstead case, including his attorney.270 Some of these
defendants plead out; some fled to Canada; the rest were tried with Olmstead in
Seattle.271
As Olmstead’s own attorney was one of his co-defendants, another representative
was needed.

9 79

Some of his employees had already hired George Vandermeer as their

counsel, and Olmstead also became one of his clients as well.

97^

Vandemeer had gained

national recognition as a tenacious and brilliant attorney for his representation of the
Wobblies, the members of the Industrial Workers of the World.274 He had also gained a
reputation in Seattle as an excellent defender of those tried on Volstead violations.275
The trial began on January 19, 1926.

9lf\

Vanderveer was a diligent and powerful orator

who did all he could to both defend his clients at the trial and preserve the wiretapping
issue for appeal. He intended to prove that “the tapping o f a telephone line was injurious

Exceptions o f O lm stead et. al." 254. T estim ony o f Elsie O lm stead. Both in Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 372, N ational Archives and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska R egion. S ea ttle.
270 Clark, The Dry Years, 169.
271 Clark, The Dry Years, 170.
272 Clark, The Dry Years, 170. Jerry Finch actually rem ained as co -c o u n sel for th e d e fe n se , filing suit
against th e Pacific T elep h o n e and Telegraph Com pany for allow ing th e w ire ta p s to b e placed. He also
p etition ed th e court to return th e ev id e n c e seized from his office, co n ten d in g th a t th e search and seizure
violated O lm stead 's a tto rn ey-clien t privilege. This suit w as partially su ccessfu l, as th e court prohibited th e
ev id e n c e seized from Finch's office from u se against Finch and O lm stead (but it w as perm issible to u se it
against th e oth er eigh ty-n in e d efen d an ts). Clark, The Dry Years, 170.
273 There w er e 12 a ttorn eys for th e m en on trial with O lm stead . U.S. v. O lm stead "Bill o f Exceptions" 1-2,
Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational Archives and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region.
S eattle.
274 Clark, The Dry Years, 170.
275 Clark, The Dry Years, 13 1 -1 3 2 .
276 U.S. v. Olm stead "Bill o f Exceptions o f Roy O lm stead, etc." 1, Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 ,
N ational Archives and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
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to the service rendered to the extent that it destroyed or impaired the privacy of the
service to business and professional men and to the home, and that it opened up the
possibility of stealing service, and it consumed a certain amount of the electrical energy
on which the efficiency of the service depended.”

0T1

Judge Jeremiah Neterer admitted the

evidence from the wiretapping. The jury found Olmstead and most of his co-defendants
guilty on February 20, 1926.

1 7R

Neterer found that the “user o f a telephone has no

property interest in it. He has a license to use it.” In addition, foreshadowing Chief
Justice William Taft’s opinion for the majority when the case reached the Supreme Court,
Neterer pointed out that “the wire carrying this message was not tapped within the house,
- the home was not violated.”279 On March 9, 1926, Olmstead was fined ten thousand
dollars and sentenced to four years at McNeil Island Penitentiary.
Olmstead’s appeal to the Supreme Court hinged on the wiretapping issue.
Though wiretapping was illegal in Seattle under a state statute, there was no federal
legislation prohibiting agents from wiretapping or using evidence obtained from a
wiretap at trial. However, the issue of wiretapping was contentious at the time, both for
the public and within the federal government itself. For the public, wiretapping was
viewed as yet another example of the government encroaching on personal liberty. For
some in the federal law enforcement agencies, it was unethical. Mabel Walker
Willebrandt, Assistant Attorney General at the time of Olmstead’s appeal, refused to
represent the government in arguing the case before the Supreme Court. She believed
277 Erickson v. U.S. "A m endm ed A ssign m ent o f Errors" 22-23, Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , National
Archives and Records A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
278 U.S. v. Olm stead "Verdict" 1, Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational A rchives and Records
A dm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. S eattle.
279 U.S. v. Olm stead "Opinion o f th e Court (On M otion to Supress w ire-tap pin g co n v ersa tio n s as
evidence)" 1. January 1 8 ,1 9 2 6 , Record Group 21. Boxes 3 6 9 -3 7 2 , N ational A rchives and Records
Adm inistration - Pacific Alaska Region. Seattle.
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that wiretapping is “a dangerous and unwarranted practice to follow in enforcing the
law.” Others in law enforcement thought it was “an essential medium against the large
7 OA

liquor syndicate, and can not be replaced.”

On first application, Olmstead’s appeal to the Supreme Court was denied in 1927.
Soon after, other similar cases were appealed to the Supreme Court for review. In 1928,
the Court accepted certiorari, agreeing to hear the appeal, for three cases, including
Olmstead, on the limited review of the constitutionality of admission of the warrantless
wiretapping evidence. The court split 5-4 upholding the verdict against Olmstead, with
each of the dissenting justices writing a separate opinion.

9521

Chief Justice Howard Taft wrote the majority opinion, stating from the outset that
the decision was, “confined to the single question whether the use of evidence of private
telephone conversations between the defendant and others, intercepted by means of wire
tapping, amounted to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.” The opinion
continued with a summation of the evidence against Olmstead, testified to at trial. He
then summarized the existing Supreme Court doctrines applicable to the case. Boyd v.
United States widened the scope of search and seizure, as protected by the Fourth
amendment, to government actions not amounting to a physical search of property or
seizure of materials therein. Weeks v. United States provided that evidence obtained by
government officials without a valid search warrant was inadmissible at trial. Taft
insisted that the language of the Fourth Amendment refers to material things seized and
physical places searched. By this logic, “There was no searching. There was no seizure.

280 H ouse C om m ittee on E xpenditures in th e Executive D ep artm ents, W ire Tapping in Law Enforcement,
7 1 st Cong., 3 rd se ss., 1931, 18-19.
281 The ca se is referred to as O lm stead et. al. v. U nited States, but th e ca ses d ecid ed in ta n d em w ere
Green e t al. v. U nited States, and Mclnnis v. U nited States (277 U.S. 4 3 8 ).
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The evidence secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no
entry of the houses of [sic] offices of the defendants.” He differentiated the Olmstead
case from others invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment, writing that the
Fourth Amendment is “not violated against a defendant unless there has been an official
search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material
effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of
making a seizure.” The majority opinion held that “the wire tapping here disclosed does
not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Taft
wrote that, even though the evidence may have been obtained unethically, this does not
bar its admission at trial. He suggested at one point that the legislature, if it deemed
wiretapping unethical, could create laws forbidding federal agents from collecting
evidence in this manner, but the Court was unwilling to find wiretapping as
constitutionally prohibited. He also notes that the Washington Wiretapping Statute,
while making interception of telephone messages a misdemeanor, and thus criminal, it
does not specifically bar the admission into evidence of those messages. 282
•

Justice Brandeis wrote the most notable dissent from the majority opinion. In it
he expounded on the privacy rights that would be embraced by the Court later in the
twentieth century. His dissent that is often cited by those seeking protection under the
Fourth Amendment from government interference in privacy rights of all kinds. He
wrote in his dissent of the changing nature of technology, certainly beyond that
envisioned when the Bill of Rights was first authored. And with these changes, “subtler

282 Olm stead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 4 3 8 , 4 5 5 , 468; Boyd v. U.S. 116 U.S. 616; Weeks v. U.S. 2 3 2 U.S. 383.
"Curtilage" refers to th e physical area im m ed iately surrounding a h o u se, but still on th e property o f th e
h om eo w n er. The cartilage is w ithin th e sc o p e o f Fourth A m en d m en t p ro tectio n s, w h erea s "open fields"
are not.
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and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the
Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain.disclosure in court of
what is whispered in the closet.” Brandeis foresaw more technological advances that
would allow government espionage to intrude further on individuals’ privacy. Brandeis
remembered Boyd differently than Taft; he quoted from the Boyd decision, “The
principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence o f constitutional liberty and
security... they apply to all invasions on the part of the Government and its employees of
the sanctities of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property.” After discussing the liberal application of Boyd to situations that did not
involve a literal search or seizure, Brandeis launched into his oft-quoted passage.
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance o f man’s spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to ‘be found in material things. They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To
protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal
proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of
the Fifth.... Men bom to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
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Brandeis also believed, that regardless of the Constitutional issues, the evidence should
not have been admitted as it was obtained in violation of the state statute.
Justice Holmes, concurred with Brandeis and wrote, “the Government ought not
to use evidence obtained and only obtainable by a criminal act,” calling wiretapping
“dirty business.”284 He felt that Weeks should apply to this case: “the reason for
excluding evidence obtained by violating the Constitution seems to me logically to lead
to excluding evidence obtained by a crime of the officers of law.” Justice Butler
dissented from Taft’s literal interpretation of the words of the Fourth Amendment,
arguing instead that the Constitution should be interpreted “in light of the principles upon
which it was founded.” He believed that there was a privacy interest in the
communications and their transmission by telephone, and that the eavesdropping
“constituted a search for evidence.” Justice Stone concurred with the opinions of
Holmes, Brandeis, and Butler. He also noted that the Court may consider questions
•

beyond the single issue upon which certiorari was granted.

0 ftS

Brandeis met all of the concerns about the enforcement o f Prohibition and the
Volstead Act itself in his analysis. He wrote specifically that wiretapping technology
allowed the government access to presumed personal conversations that should be
afforded the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, he locates the right to
privacy conceptually, not determined by residence or property rights - the “material
things” from which he distances his argument. It is liberty itself - “beliefs, thoughts,
emotions” - that the Fourth Amendment should protect from governmental intrusion.
283 Olm stead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 4 3 8 , 4 7 3 , 4 74 -5 , 4 7 8 , (Brandeis d issenting), citing Entick v. Carrington, 19
H ow ell's S tate Trials, 1030.
284 Olm stead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 4 6 9 , 4 7 0 , (H olm es d issenting).
285 Olm stead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 4 6 9 -4 7 1 , 48 7 , 48 8 , (Butler and S ton e d issenting).
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Without being explicit, he puts the Volstead Act itself in conflict with the Fourth
Amendment. Not only should citizens have an expectation that what happens in their
home is protected, but they should also be afforded the “right to be let alone” from
unreasonable government intrusion in all aspects of their life. Melvin I. Urofsky noted
that Brandeis’s dissent shifted the emphasis [of the Fourth Amendment] from where the
alleged wrong took place to how it affected the individual.”
Looking at the reality of Prohibition enforcement in tandem with the
Constitutional doctrine affords an opportunity to see the law and society interacting in a
way that is often difficult to parse out. The sudden surge of Fourth Amendment cases
was directly related to Volstead and its enforcement - the Court was forced to examine
the Fourth Amendment in a way that it had not had to before Prohibition. The new
circumstances of daily life created situations that tested the boundaries of a certain aspect
of jurisprudence. This happens any time a case makes its way to the Court: the law never
exists in a vacuum, completely separated from the society in which it evolves. However,
the cases decided prior to the Olmstead decision, and Olmstead itself, all dealt with
Volstead and its enforcement. All of these cases forced examination of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court increasingly circumscribed the contours of exceptions to the
search and seizure requirements. Finally, in Olmstead, four Justices agreed that the
protections of the Amendment had been violated. Four wanted to explore the other side
of the Amendment - the contours of the right protected, the line at which governmental
intrusion was not acceptable. Those four wanted the assumption to be that a citizen has

287 Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis, 631.
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the right to be left alone.288 While not enough to create the right to privacy at the time,
this case was nonetheless decided by the slimmest of majorities possible. Olmstead was
overturned in 1967 when the C ourt, in Katz v. United States, held that the Fourth
Amendment protections apply when a person has an actual expectation of privacy that is
“reasonable” by society’s standards. Physical trespass was not necessary for a
government official’s actions to constitute an unconstitutional search - “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.”289
The significance of Prohibition itself to this evolution of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is highlighted by the fact that these issues were not re-examined for years.
Once the Twenty-First Amendment was ratified, and Prohibition enforcement was no
longer an issue, there was not the same flood of cases created by the methods and
circumstances of the Prohibition Bureau and the Prohibition law to force the Court to
opine about the Fourth Amendment, or government overreaching, or privacy. And so,
the evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine slowed until the 1960s, when legal aid
societies and bar associations began to concern themselves with the rights of the accused.
After the 1920s, there was no similar temporal surge in cases that tested the Fourth
Amendment, and no specific law being enforced. However, since the Eighteenth
Amendment was repealed, most of the cases brought to the Supreme Court for Fourth
Amendment violations are “vice” cases - gambling, pornography, but mostly drugs.
Even Katz involved the FBI investigating a gambling ring. The Fourth Amendment is

288 Norm an H. Clark roots th e s e d evelo p in g con cern s for "individual civil liberty" and "private morality" in
m odernity i t s e l f - w ant-gratification d em a n d s p rotection for privacy. D eliver Us From Evil, 178. Ulofsky
n o te s th at Brandeis "argued th at ju d ges n eed to take th e facts o f m od ern life into a cco u n t in their
d ecisions." Louis D. Brandeis, xi.
289 Katz v. U nited States 3 8 9 U.S. 347, 3 4 7 -8 (1 9 6 7 ).
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constantly tested in situations where the government oversteps boundaries to enforce a
law and the law itself implicates privacy concerns 290
The nature of privacy has been constantly negotiated throughout the twentieth
century. It is certainly the intent of the paper to encourage the reader to compare this
analysis to modem discussions of the limits of government intrusion with the advent of
new criminal organizations (the “terrorist” and the “drug czar”), a newly reorganized
federal investigation and enforcement agency (Homeland Security), and public
dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the laws this agency enforces (screenings in
airports, widespread use of marijuana).291 Investigative technologies continue to improve;
the government practically has the ability to know the contents of every American
communication made via the internet or telephone. Justice Brandeis articulated a concern
with the limitations that the Fourth Amendment places on government intrusion into the
private lives of its citizenry that still resonates nearly a century later - the contours of the
“right to be let alone.”

290 U nited States v. Jeffers, 3 4 2 U.S. 48 (1951) - drugs; D raper v. U nited States, 3 5 8 U.S. 3 0 7 (1959) drugs; M a p p v. Ohio , 3 6 7 U.S. 643 (1961) - gam bling, pornography; A gu ilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)
- drugs; Beck v. Ohio, 3 7 9 U.S. 89 (1964) - drugs; Spinelli i/. U nited States, 393 U.S. 4 1 0 (1969) gam bling; Adam s v. Williams, 4 0 7 U.S. 143 (1972) - drugs; U nited States v. Robinson, 4 1 4 U.S. 218 (1973)
- drugs; Gustafson v. Florida, 4 1 4 U.S. 2 6 0 (1 9 7 3 ) - drugs; U nited States v. Havens, 4 4 6 U.S. 6 2 0 (1980) drugs; Illinois v. Gates, 4 6 2 U.S. 213 (1983) - drugs; United States v. Place, 4 6 2 U.S. 6 9 6 (1983) - drugs;
Colorado v. Bertine, 4 7 9 U.S. 3 6 7 (1987) - drugs; M u rra y v. U.S. 4 8 7 U.S. 5 3 3 (1988) - drugs; United States
v. Sokolow, 4 9 0 U.S. 1 (1989) - drugs; Floridg v. Wells, 4 9 5 U.S. 1 (1990) - drugs; A la b a m a v. White, 4 9 6
U.S. 325 (1990) - drugs; Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 4 2 9 (1991) - drugs; W hren v. U nited States, 5 1 7 U.S.
8 0 6 (1996) - drugs; M in n e s o ta v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1 9 9 8 ) - drugs; Bond v. U nited States, 5 2 9 U.S. 3 3 4
(2000) - drugs; Kyllo v. U nited States, 533 U.S. 27 (2 0 0 1 ) - drugs; Board o f Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 8 2 2
(2002) - drugs.
291 Roy O lm stead served his four years at McNeil Island Penitentiary, U pon his re lea se in May 1931, he
took a job w ith a credit bureau. He b eca m e a Christian S cientist w h ile in prison and after his relea se
w orked am o n g th e prisoners at M cNeil Island. Clark, The Dry Years, 23 9 . He w as p ard oned by President
Franklin D elano R oosevelt on D ecem b er 2 5 ,1 9 3 5 . For a short d escrip tion o f his w ork as a Christian
Scientist, see: h ttp ://w w w .n o r c a lc h r istia n sc ie n c e .c o m /2 0 1 0 /1 2 /r e d e m p tio n -o f-r o y -o lm ste a d .h tm l,
a ccessed March 1, 2 011.
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